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EMPOWERING INDIVIDUAL PLAINTIFFS
Gideon Parchomovskyt & Alex Steint
The individual plaintiff plays a critical-yet underap-
preciated-role in our legal system. Only lawsuits that are
brought by individual plaintiffs allow the law to achieve the
twin goals of efficiency and fairness. The ability of individual
plaintiffs to seek justice against those who wronged them de-
ters wrongdoing, ex ante, and in those cases in which a wrong
has been committed nevertheless, it guarantees the payment
of compensation, ex post. No other form of litigation, including
class actions and criminal prosecutions, or even compensation
funds, can accomplish the same result. Yet, as we show in
this Essay, in many key sectors of our economy, suits by
individual plaintiffs have become a rare phenomenon, If not a
virtual impossiblity. The architecture of liability, by making
causes of action more complex and difficult to prove, while
equipping defendants with multiple defenses, coupled with
the fact that large corporate defendants enjoy a vast cost ad-
vantage over individual plaintiffs on account of superior legal
expertise and economies of scale and scope, make it nearly
impossible for individual plaintiffs to prevail in court, or even
get there. This problem pervades many industries, but, for the
reasons we detail, it is particularly acute in the insurance,
healthcare, medical, and consumer finance sectors.
To address this growing problem, we propose a full-
Jledged legal reform that encompasses substantive, procedu-
ral, evidentiary, and remedial measures. Substantively, we
explain how civil liability should be redesigned to give afairer
chance to individual plaintiffs. Spectfcaly, we call for the
simpliflcation of causes of action and the elimination of cum-
bersome elements that doom many individual lawsuits. Pro-
cedurally, we propose afast-track litigation course that would
enable courts to resolve disputes expeditiously. As we show,
the introduction of this new procedure would deprive corpo-
rate defendants of one of their most critical advantages: the
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ability to extend litigation over long periods of time and make
it more costly than it should. Evidentially, we recommend that
lawmakers shift the burden of proof of certain disputed ele-
ments from plaintiffs to defendants and explain how this
could be done. Finally, as far as remedies are concerned, we
make a case for a new preliminary remedy-a partial pay-
ment order-define the conditions under which it should be
awarded, and argue for a more extensive use of statutory
damages and damage multipliers. Implementing our pro-
posed reform will go a long way toward restoring the pride of
place individual plainttffs traditionally held in our legal
system.
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INTRODUCTION
Our legal system is organized around the concepts of rights
and duties.' Freedom, autonomy, bodily integrity, property,
and other interests and values that receive legal recognition are
typically protected by rights that impose duties on third parties
to respect them.2 In the theoretical literature, rights are often
idealized as "trumps," whose mere invocation suffices to afford
them.3 Rights, however, are not self-enforcing. They must be
vindicated via our legal system or, more precisely, through liti-
gation. Actual litigation is not always necessary. Oftentimes,
1 For a classic account of this organization, see Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld,
Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE
L.J. 16, 28 (1913).
2 Id. at 20-25, 28-32 (distinguishing between legal and non-legal interests
and explaining how interests that receive legal recognition fall into different cate-
gories of rights).
3 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOuSLY, at xi (2d ed. 1977).
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the threat of commencing litigation will suffice to protect rights.
But the threat must be credible: a rightholder must be able to
commence a case in court in order to deter violations of her
right. As a legal matter, a rightholder is at liberty to take her
plight to court. As an economic matter, things are dramatically
different. From an economic perspective, if rightholders are
rational self-interest maximizers, they will litigate if and only if
litigation dominates the alternatives of settling or doing
nothing.
Critically, the attractiveness of the alternatives, and hence
the ultimate decision as to how to proceed, depends in large
part on a single variable: the relative litigation costs of the
parties involved.4 To see this, imagine a world without litiga-
tion costs, a conceptual parallel universe of the Coasean world
in which there are no transaction costs.5 In this imaginary
world, suits can be filed at no cost and by hypothesis court
decisions are rendered instantaneously and correctly. In this
imaginary world, rightholders would always choose to litigate
and more importantly they will always be made whole. All
wrongs will be righted immediately either by damages or by
injunctive relief, and rights will reign supreme.
The analysis dramatically changes when one moves to the
real world in which litigation costs are positive. Consider the
following stylized example. Imagine that Sam encroached upon
Ann's property. Assume, first, that as a result Ann suffered a
harm of $2,000. However, in order to vindicate her claim in
court, Ann would have to spend $6,000 on court and attorney
fees. Sam, on the other hand, can defend himself at an esti-
mated cost of $1,000. Unless Ann is a very principled person
and is willing to pay for her principles, she will choose not to
sue. For her, the suit has a net negative value of $4,000
($6,000-$2,000). Therefore, from a purely economic perspec-
tive, Ann's best option is either to settle the case out of court or
do nothing. Doing nothing represents a loss of $2,000 for Ann,
but litigating implies an even greater loss of $4,000. Ann may
also attempt to settle the case with Sam, but since Ann's litiga-
tion threat is not credible in this case, her settlement offer will
fall on deaf ears. The upshot of our analysis is strikingly sim-
4 See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Relational Contingency of
Rights, 98 VA. L. REV. 1313, 1314-15 (2012) (showing that a right's realization
depends on the rightholder's cost of vindicating it and the challenger's cost of
attacking it in court).
5 Cf. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (proving
famously that, in a transaction-cost-free world, assets and entitlements will al-
ways navigate to their most efficient users).
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ple: asymmetrical litigation costs render rights ineffective in
practice.6
Importantly, our hypothetical is highly representative. In
the real world, litigation costs are almost never symmetrical
and affect the parties unevenly. To be sure, in many cases the
asymmetry in litigation costs would lead rightholders to settle.
As we will show, the actual settlement amount is a function of
many variables, but the relative bargaining power of the parties
is determined by their respective litigation costs. At the end of
the day, therefore, a rightholder's ability to obtain justice criti-
cally depends on the asymmetry between her litigation costs
and those of her adversary.7
Some of the factors that determine a rightholder's willing-
ness to litigate are highly subjective. For example, risk aver-
sion, liquidity constraints, and pessimism may prompt
rightholders to settle rather than litigate. Such rightholders
harbor a preference for a certain and quick resolution of their
disputes. Hence, they will be predisposed to accept a low set-
tlement offer from the other party. But many other factors that
slant the legal playing field are objective; in fact, they are borne
from the design of our legal system. At times, the statutory
definition of certain causes of action is so complex and mul-
tifaceted that plaintiffs find themselves at an inherent disad-
vantage when they try to enforce their rights.6 Naturally, as the
number of elements the plaintiff needs to prove increases, so
does the cost of the lawsuit. Since the burden of proof falls on
the plaintiff, she must successfully prove each element of her
cause of action. When the elements are complex, it may be-
come a Herculean task. To make matters worse, the law usu-
ally provides multiple defenses to a particular cause of action,
which once again disadvantages plaintiffs.9 In such cases, the
defendant only needs to succeed on one defense claim to pre-
vail, while the plaintiff needs to negate all defense claims to win
in court. The multifaceted structure of legal entitlements and
the availability of multiple defenses thus uniformly benefit de-
fendants over plaintiffs.' 0
Finally, even when a plaintiff is able to surmount all these
obstacles, she must still prove her harm and causally attribute
6 See Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 4, at 1341-45.
7 Id.
8 See Jef De Mot & Alex Stein, Talking Points, 2015 U. ILL. L. REv. 1259,
1260-62 (2015) (showing how conceptual complexity of entitlements skews adju-
dicative errors against plaintiffs).
9 Id. at 1264-67.
10 Id.
1322 [Vol. 102:1319
EMPOWERING INDIVIDUAL PLAINTIFFS
it to the defendant's wrongdoing in order to be made whole.
Doing so, however, is often impossible. Causal uncertainty
does not allow the legal system to offer adequate compensation
for pain, suffering, and other kinds of emotional and psycho-
logical harm.1 1 But even in the case of economic losses, plain-
tiffs often face a tough dilemma. In order to prove their losses
with sufficient accuracy, they must expend considerable re-
sources. This, in turn, dramatically reduces their net compen-
sation and sometimes makes the lawsuit unattractive from a
cost-benefit perspective. For example, in securities litigation,
the need to show market harm and causation nips many poten-
tial suits in the bud. 12
Most importantly, though, litigation is characterized by
economies of scope of scale. Repeat defendants, such as insur-
ance companies, financial institutions, and health care provid-
ers (to name just a few), enjoy an inherent advantage over
individual plaintiffs. Repeat players typically retain attorneys
on a fixed basis, which lowers the marginal cost of legal repre-
sentation for them. Furthermore, since there are typically
many commonalities in the cases brought against them, they
can often reuse documents, briefs, research, and legal exper-
tise from past cases. Consider, for example, an insurance com-
pany that is sued by an insured. In the typical case, the suit
will be based on the contract between the parties. Not only was
that contract drafted by the legal department of the insurance
company, which gives it a critical informational advantage, but
also, chances are, that the insurance company handled multi-
ple similar lawsuits in the past and can therefore readily re-
spond to the present suit. The individual insured, by contrast,
will need to hire an attorney especially for this suit, pay her to
learn the case and draft the briefs, as well as for every court
appearance. In light of the systemic asymmetry in litigation
costs, it is not surprising that the vast majority of lawsuits
brought against insurance companies by individuals settle be-
low their expected value.
Consider now a suit for medical malpractice. Contrary to
some populist claims, proving medical malpractice allegations
11 See ARIEL PORAT & ALEX STEIN, TORT LIABIITIY UNDER UNCERTAINIY 57-83
(2001) (identifying five paradigmatic cases in which causal uncertainty coupled
with the conventional proof burden prevents victims from recovering compensa-
tion for their damages).
12 See generally Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concerr Causation and Federal Se-
curities Fraud, 94 IowA L. REV. 811, 840-44 (2009) (specifying and analyzing the
complexities of the causation requirements in securities fraud actions).
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against doctors and hospitals is extremely difficult.' 3 Doctors,
hospitals, and their insurers have accumulated nearly all infor-
mation pertaining to the medical standards and experts, which
makes it cheaper for them to defend against malpractice suits
than for individual plaintiffs to prosecute those suits. Argua-
bly, because plaintiffs pay their attorneys only after recovering
compensation, the defendants' superior expertise does not foil
their access to justice. This argument, however, is wrong be-
cause it pays no attention to the estimation of expected recov-
ery amounts by plaintiffs' attorneys and to the attorney's
opportunity costs. The defendants' advantage affects both of
those factors in that it reduces the expected recovery amounts
for plaintiffs' attorneys and requires them to expend more ef-
forts on the litigation. As a result, attorneys working on a
contingent fee basis tend to take up easy medical malpractice
cases only while steering away from the difficult ones. Many
victims of medical malpractice are consequently being denied
their rights.
While lawmakers cannot easily change the market condi-
tions that favor large defendants, they can change the design of
the law to offset the inherent economic advantage of such de-
fendants over individual plaintiffs.' 4 In this Essay, we propose
a blueprint for legal reform that would alleviate the plight of
multiple individual plaintiffs who cannot at present enforce
their rights. We would like to emphasize at the outset that our
proposal is limited to those legal settings in which defendants
13 See supra subpart III.A.
14 By setting up a restrictive "plausibility pleading" standard for determining
whether a complaint's allegations justify moving to discovery and trial, the Su-
preme Court's decisions, Bell AtL Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), took the law in the opposite direction. As
Professor Arthur Miller observes, these decisions were
the latest steps in a long-term trend that has favored increasingly
early case disposition in the name of efficiency, economy, and avoid-
ance of abusive and meritless lawsuits. It also marks a continued
retreat from the principles of citizen access, private enforcement of
public policies, and equality of litigant treatment in favor of corpo-
rate interests and concentrated wealth.
Arthur R Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 10 (2010); cf. Adam N. Steinman, The
Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1298 (2010) (arguing that the "plausibil-
ity pleading" standard preserves old law and its liberal approach to pleadings
while preventing plaintiffs from relying on unspecified conclusory allegations). A
recent empirical study confirms Professor Miller's assessment. See Alexander A.
Reinert, Measuring the Impact of Plausibility Pleading, 101 VA. L. REV. 2117, 2122
(2015) (showing that the "plausibility pleading" standard led to an increase in the
rate of direct dismissals, with civil rights and employment discrimination suits
taking the hardest hit, and that the standard's repercussions for individual plain-
tiffs were far more profound than for corporations).
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enjoy a sizable and consistent cost advantage over plaintiffs.
Our proposal consists of three interlocking components. First,
we recommend setting up special procedures for fast-track liti-
gation. Our second recommendation identifies a new remedial
mechanism: advanced payment orders issued by courts.
Third, we call on lawmakers to reformulate causes of action in
order to reduce the number and complexity of the substantive
requirements the plaintiffs have to prove. As part of that pro-
posal, we posit that our evidentiary rules should be altered in
order to make it easier for plaintiffs to substantiate their
claims. In this respect, lawmakers can adopt a range of strate-
gies, from shifting the burden of proof, to lowering or increasing
it in appropriate cases, to setting up evidentiary presumptions
that favor plaintiffs. Finally, we call for the adoption of en-
hanced statutory damages as an alternative to actual damages.
Individual plaintiffs are of vital importance to our legal sys-
tem.' 5 Lawsuits by individual victims are unique in that they
constitute the only litigation form that simultaneously ad-
vances the twin goals of deterring wrongdoers and compensat-
ing victims. Neither class actions (or other types of collective
suits) nor the use of governmental compensation funds can
accomplish these twin goals. Class actions, when available,
can deter wrongdoing, but their ability to secure proper com-
pensation for the wrongdoings' victims is limited at best.16
Compensation funds, as their name suggests, provide recom-
pense to victims, but do little by way of deterring future wrong-
doings. The best way to realize the goals of compensation and
deterrence is to enable victims to pursue individual justice
against those who wronged them. We therefore chose to focus
solely on how to enable individual plaintiffs to vindicate their
entitlements in the courts of law.
This Essay will unfold in four parts. In Part I, we analyze
the defendants' structural advantage: their ability to exploit
multiple defenses and the multifaceted structure of legal
rights. In Part II, we analyze the causes and consequences of
15 See, e.g., David Freeman Engstrom, Private Enforcement's Pathways: Les-
sons from Qut Tam Litigation, 114 COLUM. L. REv. 1913, 1918-20 (2014) (under-
scoring individual plaintiffs' important role in civil litigation); Michael Selmi,
Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and Employ-
ment, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1401, 1404 (1998) (highlighting the role of private plaintiffs
in developing housing and job discrimination law through the assertion of "cut-
ting edge" claims).
16 For a recent comprehensive examination of class actions' pros and cons,
see JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., ENTREPRENEURIAL LITGATION: ITS RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE
(2015).
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the defendants' cost advantage: their ability to litigate at a
much lower cost than plaintiffs on account of economies of
scale and scope. In Part III, we identify legal areas in which
defendants systematically enjoy structural and cost advan-
tages. These areas include healthcare, medical malpractice,
insurance, and consumer finance. In Part IV, we specify and
evaluate our prcposals to empower individual plaintiffs. A
short Conclusion follows.
I
THE ARCHITECTURE OF LIABILITY
For reasons that are far from clear, the architecture of civil
liability inherently favors defendants. As Jef de Mot and one of
us recently demonstrated, plaintiffs face an uphill battle when
they litigate.1 7 The cause of the plaintiffs' disadvantage goes to
the very core of our justice system. In order to prevail, plain-
tiffs must establish all the elements of their case. Failure to
prove a single element would result in the loss of the entire
case. Defendants, by contrast, need only succeed on a single
defense, out of many possible ones, in order to win in court. 18
As an illustration, consider a suit for a breach of contract.
To secure a remedy in court, a plaintiff must prove the follow-
ing elements by preponderance of the evidence: (1) the parties
consummated a valid contract; (2) the contract imposed a duty
on the defendant to perform a certain act or refrain from a
certain undertaking; (3) the defendant breached her contrac-
tual duty; and (4) the plaintiff suffered a harm as a result of the
breach.' 9 The plaintiff must prove all these elements cumula-
tively; there can be no gap in the plaintiffs case. This means
that if the defendant manages to prevail on a single element,
the plaintiffs entire case collapses.
Critically, defendants have multiple ways to rebut each of
the elements in the plaintiffs case-a fact that compounds the
plaintiffs disadvantage. For example, the defendant can argue
that there was no contract between the parties either because
17 De Mot & Stein, supra note 8, at 1264-69. Indeed, in a recent empirical
study, Alexandra Lahav and Peter Siegelman report that plaintiffs' win rate has
fallen to about 35%. See Alexandra D. Lahav & Peter Siegelman, The Curious
Incident of the Falling Win Rate 1 (July 7, 2017) (available at SSRN: https://
ssm.com/abstract=2993423 [https://perma.cc/UUL4-X99E]).
18 Id. at 1266-67.
19 See, e.g., Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman, 250 P.3d 1115, 1121 (Cal.
2011) ("[The elements of a cause of action for breach of contract are (1) the
existence of the contract, (2) plaintiffs performance or excuse for nonperform-
ance, (3) defendant's breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff." (citing
Reichert v. General Ins. Co., 442 P.2d 377, 381 (Cal. 1968))).
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there was no meeting of the minds between the parties or be-
cause the parties failed to satisfy certain formalities. If the
defendant is a corporation, it may also claim that the contract
was signed ultra vires and is therefore null and void. In the
alternative, the defendant may argue that there were fatal de-
fects in the formation of the contract, as a result of which the
court should release it from the contract. Concretely, the de-
fendant can claim that the contract should be rescinded on
grounds of mistake, 20 impossibility,2 1 frustration of purpose, 22
unconscionability, 23 fraud, 24 conditions, 2 5 undue influence, 26
and duress. 2 7 Next, the defendant can challenge the plaintiffs
interpretation of the contract and advance a different reading
under which there was no breach. Finally, the defendant can
contend that the plaintiff suffered no harm from the breach, or
that even if she did, the court should not award her a remedy
because she failed to mitigate her harm or because the limita-
tion period has run out.
The same pattern characterizes tort litigation. In order to
prevail in a negligence suit, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) the
defendant owed her a duty of care; (2) the defendant breached
her duty; and (3) the plaintiff suffered harm from the breach. 28
Once again, the plaintiff must prove all of the aforementioned
elements. The defendant, for his part, can cause the suit to
unravel by raising a single successful defense. For example, he
can show that he owed no duty of care to the plaintiff. In the
alternative, he can prove that he has not breached the duty of
care. Furthermore, he can demonstrate that the plaintiff suf-
fered no loss or that even if there was a loss it is not causally
related to the breach of duty. Finally, the defendant can argue
that the plaintiff should not receive a remedy on grounds of
contributory negligence or laches. 29
The asymmetry between the plaintiffs case and the defen-
dant's case translates into a cost asymmetry. While the plain-
tiff must expend resources to establish each of the elements of
20 See E. ALLAN FARNSwORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 9.2-9.4, at 619-37 (3d ed. 1999)
(outlining the defense of mistake).
21 See id. §§ 9.5-9.6, at 637-52 (outlining the impossibility defense).
22 See d. §§ 9.7-9.9, at 652-67 (outlining the defense of frustration).
23 See id. § 4.28, at 307-16 (outlining the unconscionability defense).
24 See id. § 4.12, at 250-55 (outlining the fraud defense).
25 See id. § 8.2, at 519-25 (outlining the "conditions" defense).
26 See id. § 4.20, at 273-76 (outlining the undue influence defense).
27 See id. §§ 4.16, at 265-66, § 4.18 at 270-73 (outlining the economic duress
defense).
28 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 281 (AM. LAW INST. 2016).
29 See De Mot & Stein, supra note 8, at 1264-66.
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her cause of action, the defendant can concentrate on a single
defense. Worse yet, plaintiffs are subject to a first-mover disad-
vantage. Under our system of civil procedure, it is the plaintiff
who initiates the litigation process; the defendant must only
respond after a suit is filed. Consequently, a plaintiff cannot
know in advance which defense claim the defendant will choose
to emphasize. This implies that a plaintiff must cover all her
bases prior to filing a suit. The defendant, for his part, can
expend resources selectively by focusing only on promising
defenses.
It bears emphasis that the plight of plaintiffs grows worse
as causes of action become complex and the number of rele-
vant defenses grows bigger. As an illustration of the former
point, consider the cause of action of fraud on the market
under federal securities law. To succeed on a fraud on the
market claim, a plaintiff must prove scienter, i.e., "intent to
deceive," in addition to the standard elements of fraud.30 The
introduction of a scienter requirement is not just another tech-
nical hurdle that plaintiffs must overcome; rather, it is a very
significant obstacle that the law puts in the way of plaintiffs.
Proof of intent is typically not required in civil actions as it is
very difficult to make. 3 ' Plaintiffs do not have information
about defendants' state of mind, let alone their intent. Unsur-
prisingly, the need to prove scienter deters plaintiffs from
bringing actions for fraud on the market. 32
The same effect can be seen in cases in which the law
provides defendants with multiple defenses. Once again, ac-
tions for securities regulations violations provide a powerful
example. Defendants can respond to an action for a violation of
30 See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 318-24
(2007) (explaining "scienter" element of securities fraud and accompanying plead-
ing and evidentiary requirements).
31 See Alex Stein, The Domain of Torts, 117 COLUM. L. REv. (forthcoming
2017) (explaining that tort law is primarily concerned with accidents, i.e., mutu-
ally unwanted interactions that result in a damage to one of the parties); PORAT &
STEIN, supra note 11, at 7-8 (discussing modern tort liability, which does not
require proof of intent to receive damages).
32 See generally Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act?, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 598, 604-23 (2007) (dem-
onstrating empirically that "scienter" and other legal requirements made it hard
for plaintiffs to prosecute securities fraud suits); see also A.C. Pritchard, Securi-
ties Law in the Roberts Court: Agenda or Indifference?, 37 J. CORP. L. 105, 109
(2011) (observing that "scienter" requirement made it hard for plaintiffs to prose-
cute securities fraud suits); see also, e.g., Cozzarelli v. Inspire Pharmaceuticals
Inc., 549 F.3d 618, 626 (4th Cir. 2008) (explaining that although Tellabs does not
require a "smoking-gun" allegation for scienter, "plaintiffs do have the difficult
task of establishing a . . . cogent inference of scienter through indirect and cir-
cumstantial allegations").
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securities law by raising one or more of seventy-five different
defenses.3 3 The longer the list of defenses, the easier it is for
defendants to defend against a suit. Each defense represents a
potential way of prevailing on a lawsuit for the defendant. And
the more options the defendant has at his disposal, the more
likely he is to win. Correspondingly, from the plaintiffs vantage
point, an expansive menu of defenses implies a lower
probability of success on the merits, which reduces the plain-
tiffs motivation to file a suit.
Worse yet, the fact that courts occasionally make mistakes
compounds the plaintiffs' disadvantage. The intuition behind
this assertion is the following: recall that every time a court
mistakenly decides that the plaintiff failed to prove one of the
elements of her case, it dooms her case, as she must prove all
the elements cumulatively. Hence, an error against the plain-
tiff invariably leads to a loss of the entire case. An error against
the defendant, on the other hand, does not necessarily carry
the same devastating result. The defendant can survive an er-
ror relating to any given defense if he successfully proves an-
other defense. Hence, assuming that the risk of error is
randomly distributed along all the claims (or elements) in any
given case and that the rate of false positives and false nega-
tives is roughly the same, errors in adjudication exacerbate the
plight of plaintiffs.34
To illustrate, consider a $1,000,000 suit that faces two
independent defenses. Assume that this suit is meritorious,
but the court might still mistakenly uphold one of those de-
fenses, which happens approximately twenty percent of the
time with each defense. For the plaintiff, the expected judg-
ment consequently equals $640,000 (80% x 80% x
$1,000,000). Hence, if the plaintiff is rational, she would settle
her completely meritorious suit for $640,000.35 Assume now
that the defendant's attorney knows about the court's occa-
sional errors (because attorneys generally have such knowl-
edge). Based on that knowledge, the attorney decides to raise
two additional and equally unmeritorious defenses. Because
the defendant needs to succeed with only one defense in order
to prevail in the case, this addition of defenses reduces the
plaintiffs expected judgment to $409,600 (80%4 x $1,000,000).
33 See Jonathan Eisenberg, Beyond the Basics: Seventy-Five Defenses Securi-
ties Litigators Need to Know, 62 BUS. L. 1281 (2007) (discussing seventy-five
defenses that courts have used to dismiss securities suits).
34 De Mot & Stein, supra note 8, at 1264-69.
35 Id. at 1261-62.
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II
ECONOMIES OF VOLUME, SCOPE AND SCALE
The cost of law has preoccupied scholars and policymakers
for years.3 6 Surprisingly, the distribution of legal costs among
litigants drew very little attention.37 This factor is important
because litigation costs vary dramatically among litigants:
some litigants can litigate more cheaply than others. Litigation
costs determine one's access to the legal system, which in turn
affects one's ability to vindicate one's rights.38 Rights, after all,
are not self-enforcing-a fact that legal theorists, who tend to
refer to rights as conceptual categories or ideal types with an
independent legal existence, often ignore.3 9 Rights, as well as
all entitlements, must be vindicated in litigation in order to
afford their holders the protection they were designed to confer
upon them. For example, a property right is of very little value
to its holder if she cannot enforce it against trespassers. Simi-
larly, a right arising from a contract is of no use to a con-
tracting party if she cannot afford to file a suit in the case of a
breach. Hence, legal rights are of practical value only when
their holders can enforce them cost-effectively. Litigation is the
mechanism that vests rights with meaning.
Some of the factors that affect one's litigation costs are
highly idiosyncratic. Some litigants are highly risk-averse and
would prefer to overlook certain infringements of their rights in
order to avoid going to court. Others may harbor an ideological
predisposition against litigating even at the cost of seeing their
rights eroded. When litigation asymmetries arise from such
individual preferences, there is nothing that law can or should
do about it. First, individuals who prefer to avoid litigation are
neither wrong nor irrational. Hence, absent evidence that liti-
gants are not acting in their own best interest, there is no cause
for legal intervention. Second, reluctance to litigate character-
izes both potential plaintiffs and potential defendants. Accord-
ingly, there is no reason to suspect that it disparately affects
one of the groups and hence it causes no systemic problems for
36 See, e.g., STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY
LIBERTY DEPENDS ON TAXES 43 (1999) (demonstrating that enforcement costs cru-
cially affect legal entitlements and integrating them into general philosophy of
rights).
37 We initiated a conversation on this subject in Parchomovsky & Stein, supra
note 4, at 1314-21.
38 See id. at 1341-59 (discussing how litigation costs affect parties' ability to
vindicate their rights).
39 For survey and criticism of these theorists' works, see id. at 1328-35.
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the legal system. Indeed, policymakers should generally allow
people to do with their entitlements as they please.4 0
But the relative cost of litigation is not determined solely by
people's idiosyncratic tastes and preferences. Repeat litigators,
such as insurance companies, financial institutions, hospitals,
healthcare providers, and corporations more generally, can liti-
gate more cheaply than individuals.4 1 Individuals who wish to
litigate must incur substantial search costs and negotiation
costs. An individual seeking to file a lawsuit must gather infor-
mation about suitable attorneys, meet with them, and then
negotiate the terms of their engagement. Furthermore, attor-
neys typically bill one-time clients on a fixed hourly basis. 4 2
Repeat litigators, by contrast, have ready access to legal advice
and representation. They need not incur search and negotia-
tion costs every time they go to court. Repeat litigators are
typically represented by in house counsel or outside firms that
receive retainer fees. 4 3 Either way, their total cost is lower than
that of individual litigators. Volume in litigation, as in many
other contexts, translates into a cost advantage.44
The use of contingency fees does not change the analysis.
Contingency fees address two very different problems: liquidity
and risk. Specifically, the use of contingency fees appeals to
two prototypes of litigants: (a) litigants who are extremely risk-
averse; and (b) litigants who do not have the means to pay their
lawyers upfront. Such litigants are willing to pay a premium in
order to be charged based on the outcome of the case. Contin-
gency fees allow them to share their recovery with their attor-
ney in the event of victory and pay nothing in the event of a
loss. Contingency fees thus shift the cost and risk from the
client to the attorney. Naturally, attorneys would agree to work
on a contingency basis only for much higher compensation and
only in cases with a high probability of success. The greater
the cost and the risk, the higher will be the contingency fee.
And the higher the fee that an attorney charges, the less moti-
vated a plaintiff will be to sue. Similarly, from the vantage
point of the attorney, if the amount of work she will need to
invest in a case is very significant, she will not take the case
unless the expected payoff is high enough to offset the cost.
40 See Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, 56 MONiST 64, 80 (1972) (arguing that
state paternalism can only be justified as a means against "far-reaching, poten-
tially dangerous and irreversible" decisions).
41 See Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 4, at 1344-45.
42 See id. at 1344.
43 See id.
44 Id. at 1344-45.
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Contingency fees therefore do not alleviate the problem of cost
asymmetry. Moreover, the contingency fee structure motivates
attorneys to maximize their business income by striking cheap
settlements with defendants early in the litigation process.4 5
Such settlements once again come at the plaintiffs' expense.
Another important factor that slants the litigation playfield
is the presence of economies of scale and scope. A cost struc-
ture displays economy of scale when the average total cost of
production or provision declines with each additional unit.4 6 A
cost function exhibits economies of scope when the marginal
cost of production or provision declines when two or more
goods or services are provided together. 47 Litigation is often
characterized by economies of scale and sometimes also by
economies of scope. Attorneys, legal departments, and firms
that specialize in certain types of cases become highly special-
ized in their craft. To begin with, they can use the same legal
research and training in multiple cases. Then, they can use,
with minor adjustments, the same letters, briefs, and contract
drafts in a large number of cases. Finally, they can engage the
same experts, document reviewers, paralegals, and support
staff in all the similar cases they handle. As a result, the mar-
ginal cost of handling every individual case will steadily de-
cline. These economies widen the gap between large corporate
litigants, who enjoy them, and the rest of the public, who does
not.4 8
Although economies of scope in litigation are rarer than
economies of scale, they, too, arise in certain cases. At times,
45 This problem is particularly acute in class actions. See, e.g., Alon Harel &
Alex Stein, Auctioning for Loyalty: Selection and Monitoring of Class Counsel, 22
YALE L. & POLY REV. 69, 71 (2004) ("The class attorney's egoistic incentive is to
maximize his or her fees-awarded by the court if the action succeeds-with a
minimized time-and-effort investment. This objective does not align with a both
zealous and time-consuming prosecution of the class action, aimed at maximizing
the amount of recovery for the class members."); In re Activision Blizzard, Inc.
Stockholder Litig., 124 A.3d 1025, 1070 n.28 (Del. Ch. 2015) (citing the above-
mentioned excerpt with approval). See generally COFFEE, supra note 16, at 2
(explaining that a class action attorney is "a private actor, wielding a degree of
public power, but motivated by powerful economic incentives, and yet subject to
only limited accountability" and observing that "this combination of profit motive
and public purpose has made the class action plaintiffs attorney increasingly
controversial").
46 See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 272-73 (6th ed.
2009).
47 DAVID BESANKO & RONALD BRAEUTIGAM, MICROECONOMICs 311 (4th ed. 2011)
(defining economies of scope as a "production characteristic in which the total
cost of producing given quantities of two goods in the same firm is less than the
total cost of producing those quantities in two single-product firms").
48 See Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 4, at 1338-40.
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lawsuits require expertise in more than one field. Consider, for
example, a suit for breach of contract against a financial insti-
tution or a healthcare provider. Filing such suits requires
knowledge not only of contract law but also of the relevant
regulatory framework that applies to the defendant institution.
Furthermore, it necessitates in-depth familiarity with court
practices and the relevant rules of civil procedure. Individual
litigants may need to hire several attorneys to cover the rele-
vant legal areas. Large corporations that are routinely involved
in such cases as defendants will employ a versatile group of
attorneys-a large law firm-who are steeped in all the relevant
areas. As the number of legal areas in a case increases, the
cost asymmetry between specialized defendants and unspecial-
ized plaintiffs will grow as well.
The cost asymmetries that arise from specialization, vol-
ume, and economies of scale and scope are a cause for con-
cern. A party who can litigate more cost-effectively can use her
advantage to force her adversary into an unfavorable out-of-
court settlement. Consider the following example: the expected
value of a plaintiffs suit is $50,000 and her expected litigation
cost is $40,000. The expected cost for the defendant is only
$20,000 on account of the various economies we discussed.
The defendant can offer the plaintiff to settle the case for
$20,000, and if the plaintiff is a rational self-interest maxi-
mizer, she will accept that offer.
Such settlements are undesirable from a societal stand-
point. They are unjust, inefficient, and they stunt the develop-
ment of the law. Consider justice first. Society recognizes legal
rights (and entitlements) for a reason. They are designed to
protect important values, such as freedom, autonomy, or prop-
erty.49 Whenever a rightholder cannot fully enforce her right,
the value underlying the right is undermined to the detriment
of society at large. Violations of rights that are not addressed in
full impair the jurisprudential scheme envisioned by the legis-
lature and the courts. They disrupt the balance of rights, du-
ties, privileges, and powers in our society and erode people's
trust in the legal system.
Asymmetric litigation costs pose a problem for efficiency-
based theories as well. Efficiency-based theories are concerned
49 For a classic account of rights as protectors of fundamental values, see
generally DWORKIN, supra note 3.
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with the maximization of social welfare.50 The role of the law,
on this view, is to provide actors with an incentive to act in
ways that are welfare enhancing and refrain from acting in
ways that are welfare diminishing. 5 1 To perform this role, the
law should penalize behaviors that cause more harm than
good. 52 When an actor enjoys a litigation-cost advantage, she
can engage in behaviors that violate the dictates of economic
efficiency and do so with impunity.
To see this, imagine two actors, Renee and Sue, who own
adjacent lots. Assume that Renee is an expert litigator and as a
result can litigate at a very low cost, say, $1,000. Sue, on the
other hand, has never been to court and for her the cost of
taking a case to court is relatively high, say, $6,000. Assume
further that Sue values the right to exclude uninvited visitors
at $5,000. Renee, by contrast, derives a small benefit of $100
from trespassing on Sue's lot. It is clear that the right to ex-
clude is far more valuable to Sue than the ability to trespass to
Renee. Nonetheless, given the asymmetry between the neigh-
bors' litigation expenses, Renee can trespass on Sue's lot even
though doing so results in a net social loss of $4,900. Indeed,
given that it would cost Sue $6,000 to enforce a right that she
values only at $5,000, Sue's right to exclude is practically
worthless.
Settlements driven by asymmetric litigation costs are like-
wise problematic. The amount the aggrieved party agrees to
accept in a settlement falls short of the amount she would have
accepted in a voluntary market transaction-the benchmark of
efficiency.5 3 Instead of settling her suit for its expected value,
she receives a suboptimal compensation award while her oppo-
nent realizes his cost advantage in litigation after violating her
rights. Asymmetries in litigation costs thus cause stronger
parties to bypass market transactions and disregard legal
50 See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 2-3 (2004)
(singling out social welfare as the sole criterion for evaluating social policies and
legal rules).
51 See Louis Kaplow, Information and the Aim ofAdjudicatiore Truth or Corise-
quences?, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1303, 1306-07 (2015) (adopting a standard assump-
tion that adjudication and rule-making must be geared toward inducing welfare-
enhancing behavior).
52 See id. at 1308.
53 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV.
L. REV. 741, 746 (1982) ("The contract price is normally the most efficient price, in
the economist's sense of that term, because permitting the price of a commodity to
be determined by the interaction of buyers and sellers will normally move the
commodity to its highest-valued uses, as expressed by the amounts competing
buyers are willing to pay, and will best allocate the factors necessary for the
commodity's production.").
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rights, as they know that they can do better by first violating
others' rights and then settling the case.5 4
The legal dynamic that grows out of asymmetric litigation
costs-namely, disregard for weak parties' rights followed by a
low offer to settle out of court-generates another negative re-
sult: it impedes the development of the law in certain areas.
Settlements extracted by strong corporate defendants are dif-
ferent from the standard settlements discussed in the litera-
ture. They are not randomly distributed among litigants; nor
are they randomly distributed among all legal domains.
Rather, they arise from a systemic advantage of certain classes
of litigants over others. Furthermore, they are concentrated in
certain areas of the law, such as healthcare, insurance, and
financial services. Hence, settlements arising from systemic
litigation cost advantages distort the path of law.
In the following part, we identify core litigation areas in
which the problem of asymmetric costs is particularly acute
and explain how it affects plaintiffs in those areas. As we just
noted, those areas include healthcare, insurance, and financial
services. Their centrality stems from the fact that virtually
every American family is bound to encounter legal problems
with healthcare, financial services, and insurance. Further-
more, as we will now demonstrate, those problems oftentimes
force an ordinary citizen to wage an uphill battle as a plaintiff
in a suit against a powerful corporate provider of healthcare,
financial services, or insurance.
III
PLAINTIFFS' SYSTEMIc DISADVANTAGE ILLUSTRATED
In this part, we discuss several litigation settings in which
the odds are overwhelmingly stacked against individual plain-
tiffs. We show that the plight of plaintiffs is especially acute
when they face litigation against healthcare providers, medical
and financial institutions, and insurance companies. The ex-
amples we offer in this part are merely illustrative. Clearly,
there are many other litigation areas in which individual plain-
tiffs are inherently disadvantaged. We have chosen the specific
examples discussed below for several reasons. First, they in-
volve a very large number of Americans. Second, plaintiffs in
those areas typically suffer serious harms that call for remedia-
tion. Third, and finally, our chosen examples illuminate the
54 See Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 4, at 1326.
2017]1 1335
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
defining characteristics of litigation settings in which individ-
ual plaintiffs will have a hard time vindicating their rights.
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, individual
plaintiffs will find it hard to litigate when they are faced with:
(1) a complex liability design that combines multi-faceted
causes of action and a myriad of defenses; (2) defendants who
are better financed and can realize various economies of scope
and scale in litigation; and (3) serious time constraints that
necessitate quick resolution of the dispute. Hence, the discus-
sion in this part provides a blueprint for identifying other litiga-
tion areas that call for legislative intervention.
A. Healthcare Litigation
Americans who receive health benefits as part of their em-
ployment package assume that they will get any medical treat-
ment covered by their plan, when they need it. Unfortunately,
this assumption often does not hold when put to the test.
Under a standard provision of most health benefits plans, a
patient's physician must apply to the plan's provider and ask it
to approve the sought after treatment in a procedure known as
precertification or utilization review.55 Oftentimes, providers
refuse to grant approval, a refusal that marks the beginning of
the patient's tribulations as a potential plaintiff in a suit for
health benefits.56
A provider must provide reasons for its refusal to pay for a
treatment covered under the health benefits plan.5 7 A common
reason is that the requested treatment was not included in the
coverage or was excluded from it under the patient's circum-
stances. Alternatively, a provider may contend that the treat-
ment has cheaper, but equally effective, alternatives, which it
is ready to approve.58 Under either scenario, if the patient still
wants the treatment she must file an internal appeal with the
provider's office and ask it to reconsider its decision.5 9
55 DARLENE BRILL, UNDERSTANDING HEALTH INSURANCE 42 (1999).
56 Id.
57 Retirement Plans and ERISA FAQs, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-
center/faqs/retirement-plans-and-erisa-consumer [https://perma.cc/FQG7-
DR4N].
58 See MICHAEL A. MORRISEY, HEALTH INSURANCE 118-19 (2008) (explaining the
difference between utilization management strategies and claims adjudication
efforts undertaken by insurers).
59 See Jennifer Rudenick Ecklund & Andrew Cookingham, Strategies for Re-
sponding Effectively to a Denial of Treatment as Experimental or Investigational, 8
J. HEALTH & LIFE Sci. L. 8, 14 (2015) ("All (or nearly all) managed care agreements
and health benefit plans require a health care provider or the patient to exhaust
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At this point, the patient can challenge the provider's de-
termination. For example, she can show that the treatment
she requested is actually covered by the plan or that there are
no equally effective alternatives to that treatment. In many real
world cases, however, the provider refuses to reverse its
decision.60
Given the high cost of many medical procedures, most pa-
tients cannot afford to pay out-of-pocket for the treatment and
seek reimbursement later. Financing one's medical treatment
with one's own money is not a viable option for many patients.
Therefore, instead of going to a hospital to receive a much-
needed treatment, many patients have no choice but to take
their case to court and become plaintiffs.
One option a plaintiff has at this stage is to request a court
order that will force the provider to pay for the treatment.6 1 To
this end, the plaintiff must sue the provider for breach of con-
tract and request specific performance. Practically, however,
this option is highly unlikely to prove fruitful on account of a
virtually insurmountable time problem. For specific perform-
ance to be meaningful, the plaintiff must obtain it quickly when
the treatment she needs can still be effective. Yet, under the
applicable statute, the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA), the suit must be filed in a federal court,
where there are no fast tracks for plaintiffs who sue health
benefit providers. 62
Worse yet, the plaintiff may not even be able to file that suit
because her health benefits plan, similarly to many others,
may contain a compulsory arbitration requirement. Bypassing
this requirement is well-nigh impossible given the mandate of
all internal appeals of a plan's denial of benefits. This is true for all benefit denials,
and applies whether the denial was prospective (e.g., the plan denied the patient
or provider's request for precertification) or retrospective (most commonly, the
plan denied the provider's claim for reimbursement).").
60 See, e.g., Dustin D. Berger, The Management of Health Care Costs: Inde-
pendent Medical Review After "Obamacare", 42 U. MEM. L. REv. 255, 275 (2011)
(citing studies and describing managed care organizations' internal appeal proce-
dures as ineffective, slow, and biased).
61 Ecklund & Cookingham, supra note 59, at 16 ("If the plan does not reverse
its denial of benefits following an internal appeal, the provider can fie a lawsuit or
proceed to arbitration against the plan . . . .").
62 See, e.g., LARRY L. TEPLY & RALPH U. WHITEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 624 (4th ed.
2009) (attesting that provisional remedies can only be granted "to preserve the
status quo pending the court's determination of the parties' rights or to insure
that sufficient resources will be available to satisfy the plaintiffs claim if the
plaintiff ultimately prevails" and that the available provisional remedies include
"attachment, garnishment, sequestration, replevin, temporary restraining orders,
preliminary injunctions, land] civil arrest").
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Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 63 as interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court.64 Arbitration may proceed
faster than a court proceeding, but it will pose another serious
problem for the plaintiff: the arbitrator's incentives are inimical
to her plight. To compete with courts that enjoy public subsidi-
zation and need not attract paying customers, arbitrators must
deliver decisions that will be agreeable to the parties to arbitra-
tion. This incentive drives arbitrators towards striking a com-
promise that splits the disputed amount between the parties,
while avoiding making decisions that constitute a complete vic-
tory for one party and an unmitigated defeat for her oppo-
nent.6 5 To make matters worse, arbitrators who seek to
maximize their revenues may try to appease the repeat player
in the arbitration, namely, the health plan provider.
Even if a plaintiff can somehow overcome these hurdles,
her day in court would be anything but easy. The provider's
legal representatives will take advantage of their familiarity
with every fine detail of the health benefits plan to reject the
plaintiffs claims. The plaintiff, for her part, can also hire an
attorney specializing in ERISA, but her attorney may not pos-
sess the same level of familiarity with the plan's specific provi-
sions, which will inevitably raise the plaintiffs legal costs.
Furthermore, the plaintiffs attorney would not offer her fee
discounts, as such discounts are offered only to clients whose
representation is characterized by economies of volume, scope,
and scale.
Owing to these factors, the provider will be able to force the
plaintiff to accept an unfavorable settlement, which she would
pass up if the balance of power between the parties were fairer.
For example, the provider may offer the plaintiff to cover only
eighty percent of the cost of the treatment, leaving her to pay
63 Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §1
et seq. (2012)).
64 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 342-44 (2011) (hold-
ing that Federal Arbitration Act makes arbitration clauses broadly enforceable
and puts an end to "the judicial hostility towards arbitration that . .. had mani-
fested itself in 'a great variety' of 'devices and formulas' declaring arbitration
against public policy" (quoting Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc.,
271 F.2d 402, 406 (2d Cir. 1959))); Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class:
Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L.
REv. 623 (2012) (criticizing Supreme Court for broadly validating arbitration pro-
visions, including those that contain class action waivers).
65 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private
Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 238 (1979); Alex Stein, The Incentives to Arbitrate
Medical Malpractice Disputes, BILL OF HEALTH (Aug. 29, 2013), http://
blogs.law.harvard.edu/billofhealth/2013/08/29/the-incentives-to-arbitrate-
medical-malpractice-disputes/ [https://perma.cc/JG8H-FYTX].
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the remaining twenty percent. Even though paying the out-
standing amount is both unfair and onerous, many plaintiffs
would choose to do so in order to reduce legal costs and avoid
the uncertainty of the litigation process. Furthermore, since
expeditious resolution of the conflict is critical for most pa-
tients, they would likely agree to settle for a fraction of the
amount they are owed in order to start receiving treatment.
Waiting for the conclusion of the lawsuit may not be a viable
option in many cases.
The fact that ERISA entitles successful plaintiffs to recover
their attorney's fees from the plan's provider after winning the
case 66 does not materially affect our analysis. Belated reim-
bursement of attorney fees would not provide the plaintiff the
requisite medical treatment when she needs it. Furthermore,
the prospect of reimbursing the plaintiff for her attorney's fees
would only motivate the plan's provider to slightly improve its
settlement offer. For example, instead of offering the plaintiff
eighty percent of the treatment's cost, the provider may offer
her a ninety percent payment. Under that scenario as well, the
plaintiff would have no choice but to accept the provider's offer
and pay her own $10,000 for the treatment. For her, this
course of action is rationally superior to paying her attorney
$10,000 and litigating the case to judgment.
Importantly, ERISA remedies do not include consequential
damages that courts routinely award in tort cases.6 7 For that
reason, the plan's provider would not feel intimidated by the
plaintiffs prospect of becoming seriously ill on account of her
inability to get the treatment she needs.6 8 Providers of health
66 See 29 U.S.C § 1132(g)(1) (2012) ("In any action under this subchapter ...
by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary, the court in its discretion may allow a
reasonable attorney's fee and costs of action to either party.").
67 See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2012) ("A civil action may be brought ... by a
participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary . . . to enjoin any act or practice which
violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or ... to obtain
other appropriate equitable relief ... to redress such violations or . .. to enforce
any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan . . . ."); Cicio v. Does,
321 F.3d 83, 106 (2d Cir. 2003) (Calabresi, J., dissenting in part) (explaining that
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) does not authorize courts to award deserving plaintiffs
consequential damages because these are not considered "equitable relief'); John
H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by 'Equitable': The Supreme Court's Trail of Error
in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLuM. L. REv. 1317, 1336-42 (2003)
(criticizing the Supreme Court's exclusion of consequential damages from its defi-
nition of "equitable relief" in 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)).
68 When the plaintiffs plan is privately-purchased, rather than employment-
related, and consequently exempted from ERISA's limitations, the provider would
be able to offer the plaintiff a settlement amount that covers 90% of the treat-
ment's cost. This offer would require the plaintiff to think hard whether she is
willing to go to court and forego the needed treatment due to the $10,000
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benefit plans thus always have the upper hand in actions filed
against them by the plan members. They would always be able
to force the plan member into a cheap settlement that will deny
the member her rights. The current framework of health bene-
fit litigation makes it virtually impossible for plaintiffs to realize
these rights and obtain timely medical care.
B. Medical Malpractice Disputes
Contrary to the popular urban legend-aptly named by
Professor Tom Baker a "medical malpractice myth"69-suing
doctors for malpractice is anything but easy. To succeed in a
malpractice suit, a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the defendant-physician treated her in a way
that deviated from customary standards in the medical profes-
sion and that she incurred a harm as a result. 70 Proving devia-
tion from accepted standards is an uphill battle. Medicine is
not a precise science. There is usually more than one accept-
able way to treat a patient. Different schools of thought offer a
plurality of acceptable treatments for medical problems. 7 '
From that plurality, physicians are free to choose any treat-
ment, provided that they explain their choice to the patient and
obtain her consent.
These rules require a plaintiff who sues her physician to
rely on the testimony of an expert witness to establish that
treatment she received was substandard. 7 2 The defendant, on
the other hand, only needs to show the conformity of the dis-
puted treatment with one specialty or school of thought. If he
makes this showing, the jurors (or the judge in a bench trial)
must dismiss the suit against him. Moreover, in appropriate
circumstances, the defendant-physician might also be entitled
to the so-called "error in judgment" instruction that directs
jurors to dismiss the suit even in the case of a substandard
treatment. Such dismissal might occur if the judge is of the
opinion that it was within the defendant's discretion to deliver
any treatment approved by his profession or school of thought,
provided that he believed-correctly or incorrectly-that the
shortfall. If the plaintiff is rational, she would accept the provider's settlement
offer and participate in the cost of the treatment in the amount of $10,000.
69 TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYrH 1 (2005).
70 fI
71 Id. at 16 (-To a greater extent than many people are aware, medicine is an
art rather than a science.").
72 Id
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chosen treatment promised the patient the best prospect of
success.73
To make things even harder for plaintiffs, many jurisdic-
tions require them to append to their suits an affidavit or certif-
icate of merit from an expert who practices medicine in the
same specialty as the defendant. The requisite affidavit or cer-
tificate of merit must verify the plaintiffs malpractice allega-
tions against the defendant.7 4 This requirement imposes on
plaintiffs a substantial pretrial expenditure. Worse, yet, plain-
tiffs are allowed a limited period for filing a properly verified
suit for medical malpractice. Under a typical limitations stat-
ute, a plaintiff must file her suit within two years from the
accrual of the cause of action against the physician. The limi-
tation period starts running from the point in time at which the
plaintiff knew or had reason to believe that her physician may
have mistreated her and thereby worsened her condition.7 5
Moreover, many states have adopted statutes of repose that bar
patients from suing physicians after three years from the day of
the alleged malpractice.76 Courts have no power to extend this
period even when the effect of the physician's malpractice on
the patient remains latent for more than three years.77
Plaintiffs who manage to satisfy these prerequisites must
move to the next step and prove causation. More often than
not, making that step is as difficult as establishing that the
doctor committed malpractice. The difficulty here arises from
the fact that most patients start receiving treatment when they
already suffer from some preexisting medical condition.78 This
fact enables a negligent doctor to develop a viable claim that
the patient's illness (or injury) resulted from her preexisting
medical condition and that the patient would have been as ill
(or as injured) even if she received flawless treatment. What
makes such claims viable is the fact that it is the aggrieved
patient, not the doctor, who bears the burden of proving causa-
tion.79 For patients who suffered from a serious preexisting
73 See Alex Stein, Toward a Theory of Medical Malpractice, 97 IOWA L. REV.
1201, 1215-16 (2012).
74 See Benjamin Grossberg, Comment, Unformity, Federalism, and Tort Re-
form The Erie Implications ofMedical Malpractice Certificate ofMerit Statutes, 159
U. PA. L. Rav. 217, 218 (2010).
75 Stein, supra note 73, at 1254-55.
76 Id. at 1255.
77 Id. at 1254-55.
78 Id. at 1217.
79 Id.
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condition, the causation requirement may present an insur-
mountable obstacle.
Aware of that obstacle and the consequent injustice to the
patient, a number of state courts have relaxed the causation
requirement in medical malpractice cases, settling for a show-
ing that the alleged malpractice was a "substantial factor" in
causing the patient's injury or illness. Under the "relaxed cau-
sation" doctrine,8 0 the fact that a patient's preexisting condi-
tion also contributed to her illness or injury does not prevent
the patient from recovering full compensation from the negli-
gent doctor. The "relaxed causation" doctrine also includes the
"differential etiology" method,"' which allows the plaintiff to
recover full compensation upon showing that her doctor's mal-
practice was the most probable among the injury's known
causes. Contrary to the general "preponderance" requirement,
the probability of this comparatively strongest cause need not
exceed fifty percent in absolute terms.8 2 Finally, some courts
also have allowed patients with serious preexisting conditions
to recover compensation for their lost chances to recover from
illness.8 3 For example, when a doctor's malpractice reduces
her patient's chances to recover by twenty percent (from 30% to
10%), the doctor must pay the patient twenty percent of the
patient's damage. She cannot benefit from the patient's inher-
ent inability to prove causation by a preponderance of the
evidence.84
Many states, however, still reject some or all of the compo-
nents of the relaxed causation doctrine.8 5 In those states, a
patient must prove causation by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. If she fails to provide the requisite proof, the court must
dismiss her suit and let the negligent physician go scot-free. 86
When it comes to proving the severity of a patient's harm,
the legal system gives plaintiffs no concessions whatsoever. A
patient must prove the actual extent of her physical harm, pain
and suffering, and emotional distress. There are no automatic
statutory damages a plaintiff can recover without proof of ac-
80 Id. at 1218-26 (explaining the "relaxed causation" doctrine and its adop-
tion by different states).
81 Id. at 1221-23.
82 Id. at 1222.
83 Id. at 1225-26.
84 Id. at 1225-26 (explaining "lost chance" doctrine).
85 See id. at 1225 nn.121-22 and accompanying text.
86 See id. at 1218 n.66 and sources cited therein.
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tual harm.87 Conversely, many states have enacted statutes
that cap the amount that jurors (and judges in bench trials)
can give plaintiffs for pain and suffering, emotional distress,
lost consortium, and other noneconomic damages.88 For the
vast majority of middle and working class plaintiffs-whose
wages are relatively low-noneconomic damages make up the
largest part of the compensation award.8 9 By substantially er-
oding plaintiffs' ability to recover for the aforementioned
harms, statutory caps diminish the incentive for attorneys to
take on medical malpractice suits by middle and working class
plaintiffs on a contingent fee basis. As a result, many economi-
cally disadvantaged victims of medical malpractice cannot se-
cure adequate representation unless they fork over a
substantial fraction of their recovery to their lawyers. Caps on
noneconomic damages thus have a distinctly regressive effect
on the dispensation of justice in our society.90
To sum up, our medical malpractice laws put plaintiffs on
a racetrack with multiple hurdles that include expert-affidavit
requirements, proof of malpractice, causation, and damage,
and time-bars for filing suit. If a plaintiff fails to clear one of
these hurdles, her suit will dead-end. The defendant needs to
make the plaintiff fail only once.
Defendants in medical malpractice suits also enjoy econo-
mies of scale that are not available to plaintiffs. They can use
the same medical expertise in multiple cases. They can also
hire specialized attorneys to represent them in multiple cases
in exchange for a discounted fee. Plaintiffs, on the other hand,
can only hire attorneys for a contingent fee, customarily set at
one-third of their total compensation amount.9 ' This fee struc-
87 See, e.g., Spokeo Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (holding that
actual harm is a prerequisite for filing a suit in federal courts and that statutes
allowing unharmed plaintiffs to recover fixed damages violate Article III of the U.S.
Constitution).
88 See Stein, supra note 73, at 1253-54.
89 See Richard L. Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REV. 785, 799 (1990)
(criticizing economic tort damages for being inequitable because they "deliberately
reproduce the existing distribution of wealth and income").
90 See Stein, supra note 73, at 1256-57 (criticizing damage caps for weaken-
ing incentives against medical malpractice and failing to provide adequate relief to
seriously injured victims); see also Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d
894 (Fla. 2014) (voiding Florida's statutory cap on noneconomic damage awards
in cases of wrongful death caused by medical malpractice for violating the equal
protection clause of the Florida Constitution while rejecting the cap proponents'
claim that it was necessitated by the high cost of medical liability insurance).
91 See LESTER BRICKMAN, LAWYER BARONS: WHAT THEIR CONTINGENCY FEES REALLY
COST AMERICA 4-5 (2011) (attesting that lawyers routinely charge one-third or
more from the plaintiffs personal injury compensation).
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ture motivates the attorneys to screen away cases with a low
expected recovery amount and concentrate their effort on suits
that carry the promise of high compensation. 92 Even in those
cases, it must be borne in mind that an attorney who operates
on a contingency basis has a strong motivation to settle the
case early and move to another case.9 3 Hospitals, doctors, and
their insurers can exploit this motivation by securing a cheap
settlement that conveniently eliminates the threat of being de-
feated in court.9 4
C. Insurance Litigation
Insurance companies enjoy substantial economies of scale
and scope in litigation. They collect and pool together informa-
tion concerning the probability and the magnitude of the dam-
ages against which they insure. Insurance companies also
elicit relevant personal data from their clients and develop
standardized ways of juxtaposing the two sets of information-
statistical and personal-against each other.95 Doing so en-
ables them to formulate and price the different policies they
offer, as well as to assess the validity of policyholders' indemni-
fication claims.9 6
Insurance companies also collect and catalog information
about meritorious, unmeritorious, and downright fraudulent
claims. Their datasets allow them to identify the pattern for
each type of claim along with the "red flags" that call for thor-
ough investigation.9 7 Based on this information, they can
streamline their processing of claims and investigate suspi-
cions ones.
92 Id. at 5 (noting that attorneys carefully preselect cases they take on a
contingency basis).
93 See Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL
STUD. 189, 198-202 (1987).
94 Id.; see also Harel & Stein, supra note 45, at 87-88 (formalizing and illus-
trating the "conflict-of-interests differential" inherent in the contingent fee
structure).
95 See, e.g., Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Ex-
aggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223, 1261-68 (2004) (explaining how insurance
companies gather and organize data to assess risk).
96 See EMMETr J. VAUGHAN & THERESE VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND
INSURANCE 35-40, 87-90, 130-38 (10th ed. 2008) (explaining how insurance com-
panies gather, pool, and evaluate information pertaining to risks they insure
against).
97 John J. Ensminger, Insurance Company Anti-Money Laundering Compli-
ance A to Z: A Complete Guide to Designing, Implementing, and Enforcing an
Insurance Company AML Program, 20 J. TAX'N & REG. FIN. INSTS. 26, 28 fig. 1
(2007).
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Insurance companies' litigation setup is standardized, as
well. By and large, suits involve policyholders who sue the
company in court for failure to indemnify.95 In defending
against those suits, the company can use the information from
its dataset to cross-examine the plaintiffs and discredit their
claims. More importantly, because insurance suits have a sim-
ilar pattern, insurance companies retain (or employ in-house)
attorneys specializing in insurance law.99 Those attorneys
need to make a one-time investment in acquainting themselves
with their client's business and acquiring specialized knowl-
edge in insurance law. Specifically, the attorneys need to edu-
cate themselves about the standard terms of the company's
insurance policies and the information already assembled by
the company. They also need to set up routine methods and
protocols for working with actuaries, private investigators, and
other specialists. 10 The resulting economies of scale and
scope are enormous. They allow the company not only to take
advantage of being a coveted client on an intensely competitive
market for attorney services, but also to spread the cost of its
representation and all other expenses across multiple cases.
On account of these cost savings, insurance companies
have litigation capacities that most of their policyholders can-
not match. An insured wishing to sue under the policy terms
will have to locate an attorney and pay her considerably more
than what the company will expend on defending against the
suit. The vast cost differential separating the two parties gives
insurance companies the power to force policyholders into un-
favorable settlements and cede their rights under the policy.
Consequently, insurance companies can systematically under-
pay their insureds.10 1
98 See VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 97, at 169 (explaining how "many
forms of insurance" deal with indemnity contracts).
99 See generally Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 491
(Cal. 1994) (explaining proliferation of in-house counsel and their economic at-
tractiveness to corporations).
100 See, e.g., Stephen J. Chol, Motions for Lead Plaintiff in Securities Class
Actions, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 221 (2011) (noting that "the very largest attorney
firms ... enjoy the greatest expertise and economies of scale in bringing a securi-
ties class action"); Steven L. Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transactional
Lawyering, 12 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FiN. 486, 494 (2007) (specifying economies of
scale and scope of transactional lawyers).
101 Note that many policyholders falsely exaggerate their losses. Economists
consequently claim that insurance companies will do well to underpay all of the
claims that they process. See Keith J. Crocker & Sharon Tennyson, Insurance
Fraud and Optimal Claims Settlement Strategies, 45 J.L. & EcoN. 469, 469 (2002)
(identifying optimality conditions for insurers' underpayments and furnishing em-
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The New Mexico Supreme Court's decision in Truong v.
Allstate Insurance Companyl0 2 vividly illustrates this unscru-
pulous practice. This decision reveals that Allstate systemati-
cally used a special claim-processing software program,
"Colossus," programmed to undervalue and underpay policy-
holders' claims. 1 0 3 The court found this conduct to be in viola-
tion of the state's prohibition of "[uInfair or deceptive and
unconscionable trade practices." 0 4
Empirical studies support the predictions of our analy-
sis. 0 5 For example, a recent study carried out by the American
Association for Justice (the AAJ) 106 has revealed that a number
of big insurance companies use the "deny, delay, defend" strat-
pirical proof of systematic underpayments of injury claims arising from car
accidents).
102 227 P.3d 73 (N.M. 2010).
103 Id. at 76.
104 See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-12-3 to 57-12-10 (West 2011) (prohibiting and
making actionable "[ulnfair or deceptive trade practices and unconscionable trade
practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce"). Another good example is
Louisiana's parens patriae action against Allstate, its provider of statistical, actu-
arial, and underwriting information, and the manufacturers of computer software
programmed to undervalue policyholders' claims. Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 418, 421-23, 430 (5th Cir. 2008). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit categorized this action as an equivalent of a
"class" or "mass" action for purposes of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005.
Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2012)). Based on
this categorization, the court found "minimal diversity" between Allstate and the
individuals represented by Louisiana's Attorney General and removed the action
to federal court pursuant to the Act's provisions. Caldwell, 536 F.3d at 423. For
an insightful discussion of this case, see Dwight R. Carswell, Comment, CAFA and
Parens Patriae Actions, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 353-57 (2011).
105 See, e.g., Tom Baker, Constructing the Insurance Relationship: Sales Sto-
ries, Claims Stories, and Insurance Contract Damages, 72 TEX. L. REv. 1395,
1430-31 (1994) (arguing on empirical grounds that "insurance companies ...
engage in strategic behavior with third-party claimants" and systematically un-
derpay claims); Leon E. Trakman, David Meets Gollatf- Consumers Unite Against
Big Business, 25 SETON HALL L. REv. 617, 623 (1994) ("Insurance companies
consistently underpay valid insurance claims to horde the difference between the
amount due to each insured and the amount actually paid."); David Dietz &
Darrell Preston, Home Insurers' Secret Tactics Cheat Victims, Hike Profits, BLOOM-
BERG (Oct. 14, 2007), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=21070001&
sid=alOpZROwhvNI [https://perma.cc/FU9Q-294R] (observing that insurance
companies systematically underpay claims and providing examples). For addi-
tional examples, see Kelsey D. Dulin, Comment, The Disaster After the Disaster:
Insurance Companies' Post-Catastrophe Claims Handling Practices, 61 OKLA. L.
REV. 189, 191-92, 196-206 (2008) (explaining and illustrating how insurance
companies take advantage of catastrophe victims and underpay claims); see also
Bradshaw v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 758 P.2d 1313, 1322-23 (Ariz. 1988)
(admitting into evidence an insurer's statements in settlement negotiations to
show that it attempted to strong-arm the policyholder into a cheap settlement).
06 See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR JUSTICE, THE TEN WORST INSURANCE COMPANIES
IN AMERICA: How THEY RAISE PREMIUMS, DENY CLAIMS, AND REFUSE INSURANCE TO THOSE
WHO NEED IT MOST (2008).
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egy in handling claims.1 0 7 Industry insiders commonly refer to
this strategy as the "three Ds."' 08 This tripartite approach be-
gins with a simple "sit and wait" reaction to an insured's claim
that leads many policyholders to give up their claims, while
prompting others to hire an attorney to represent them. 109 An-
other strategy is to give awards to adjusters who deny most
claims regardless of the claims' merit. 0 As we noted, some
companies also employ the claim depreciation software' and
"corporate training" manuals that teach employees different
payment avoiding techniques.11 2 These strategies enable the
companies to have their insureds choose between lowball offers
and expensive litigation.11 3 As the AAJ reports, insureds "that
accept the lowballed settlements are treated with 'good hands'
[while those] that do not settle, frequently get the 'boxing
gloves': an aggressive litigation strategy that aims to deny the
claim at any cost."" 4 Facing this pressure, most insureds
have no choice but to accept the company's cheap offer.
As Professor Jay Feinman observes in his important book,
Delay, Deny, Defencl, 15beginning in the 1990s, many major
insurance companies turned their claims departments into
profit centers." 6 Instead of profiting from their superior exper-
tise in pricing and spreading the risks of accidents, those com-
panies generate most of their profit from breaking the insurer's
fundamental promise to indemnify the insured for losses cov-
ered by the policy. The companies' inherent cost advantage as
defendants unquestionably facilitates this unsavory
strategy.117
D. Suits against Banks
Banks and other financial institutions provide a myriad of
services to tens of millions of Americans. Those services in-
clude investments, savings, lending, credit, and account man-
agement. When acting professionally and in good faith, banks
benefit their clients in a variety of ways. They protect their
107 Id. at 2.
108 Id. at 3.
109 Id.
110 Id at 2-3.
''' Id at 3, 17.
112 Id. at 2.
113 Id. at 3.
114 Id.
115 JAY FEINMAN, DEIAY, DENY, DEFEND: WHY INSURANCE COMPANIES DON'T PAY
CLAIMS AND WHAT You CAN Do ABOUT IT (2010).
116 Id. at 5.
117 See Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 4, at 1339-41.
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clients' money from being lost and enable clients to save money
while earning interest. Banks also allow individuals to spread
the high purchasing costs of goods and services over a long
period of time, which helps individuals stay liquid and pay for
their purchases as they earn income. Finally, banks provide
their clients with dependable accounting documentation.
Unfortunately, banks, on account of the many powers they
wield, may also hurt clients by misappropriating deposits or
taking advantage of their vastly superior accounting capacity
and control of information. For example, a bank may betray its
client's trust by clandestinely increasing the interest rate on a
loan, or, conversely, by privately lowering the interest rate on
savings. Alternatively, a bank may increase clients' fees by
artificially expanding or rebranding its services. In order to
implement these unsavory schemes, banks often have their
clients sign long authorization forms with small-print provi-
sions that clients have no ability to understand and do not
bother to read.1 1 3 Often, the aggrieved client has no choice but
to take the bank to court. For the vast majority of clients,
however, litigating against a bank is a Herculean task.
The law of consumer finance is very complex. Substan-
tively, it prohibits unsavory banking practices and protects
consumers against mistreatment by financial institutions. Yet,
it is anything but consumer friendly: its general prohibitions
are riddled with exceptions that allow banks to raise a host of
affirmative defenses. As per our explanation in Part I, it is
enough for a bank to succeed on one such defense to defeat a
client's suit. The client, on the other hand, must refute each
and every defense asserted by the bank in order to prevail. As a
result, a bank can drive up clients' litigation costs simply by
raising as many defenses as it can. Moreover, the bank's abil-
ity to raise many alternative defenses also allows it to take full
advantage of courts' errors. If a court erroneously accepts one
of the defenses raised by the bank, the bank will win the case.
Worse yet, the cost of hiring a financial expert to prove the
bank's misconduct is prohibitive for most clients. And without
such an expert, the client's suit will likely fail. Banks, on the
other hand, often employ financial specialists in house. As for
118 See Jim Rendon, The Fine Print: 10 Secrets Your Bank Keeps, TODAY (July
18, 2008, 12:19 PM), http://www.today.com/news/fine-print-10-secrets-your-
bank-keeps-wbna25736566 [https://perma.cc/XIT6-7LM6]; Study: Credit Card
Agreements Unreadable to Most Americans, CREDITCARDS.COM (Sept. 16, 2016),
http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/unreadable-card-agreements-
study.php [https://perma.cc/S78V-4KXZI.
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those that do not, as repeat players, they can hire financial
experts at a discounted rate by promising them future work.
Even a client who can hire a financial expert will have to
travel a treacherous road. To prove wrongdoing by a bank, a
client would have to go over thousands of documents and
records, a labor intensive and time-consuming task. Further-
more, the agreements used by banks contain exemption
clauses, releasing the bank from liability for various harmful
acts and omissions.1 19 In principle, clients can challenge such
clauses as illegal,1 2 0 but this, too, requires expenditure of sub-
stantial resources.
For the reasons stated in the preceding paragraphs, one
can rarely find a successful suit prosecuted by an individual
client against her bank. This type of lawsuit is exceedingly
expensive and too complicated for the average client to prose-
cute successfully. Aggrieved clients therefore must pool their
resources and file a class action against their bank. Unfortu-
nately, a class action or any other collective proceeding is un-
likely to undo the wrongs suffered by aggrieved clients at the
hands of the bank.
In a recent decision, Jenkins v. Trustmark,121 a federal
court approved a settlement of a class action for debit-sequenc-
ing-an accounting manipulation with a client's debit card
transactions that depleted her account balance faster than it
should have in order to allow the bank to charge higher fees.1 2 2
After denying the alleged wrongdoing and raising multiple af-
119 See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Bankers and Chancel-
lors, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1, 39-43 (2014) (observing that investment banks routinely
include liability disclaimers and limitations in engagement letters and providing
examples); David Lazarus, Does Your Credit Card Contract Contain a Hidden Sur-
prise?, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2016) http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-lazarus
-20160415-column.html [https://perma.cc/ND3M-M5AVI (reporting that hidden
clauses in credit card agreements are widespread and that these clauses give
lenders an unfair advantage); Deon Roberts, Feds Target Arbitration Clauses in
Banks' Fine Print, THE CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Mar. 14, 2016, 7:10 PM) http://
www.charlotteobserver.com/news/business/article660475 0 7 .html lhttps://
perma.cc/CJ47-LRSZ] (noting that banks take advantage of small-print compul-
sory arbitration clauses to avoid liability for mistreating consumers). See gener-
ally Arin H. Smith, Durbin's Defect: The Impact of Post-Recession Legislation on
Low-Income Consumers, 89 N.Y.U. L. REv. 363, 386-87 (2014) (noting lack of
transparency in bank-consumer agreements and making a call to fix this
problem).
120 See Rebecca .Schonberg, Comment, Introducing "Abusive": A New and Im-
proved Standard for Consumer Protection, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1401, 1415-19 (2012)
(explaining unconscionability doctrine and other rules that enable bank clients to
invalidate contractual terms that produce extreme unfairness).
121 300 F.R.D. 291 (S.D. Miss. 2014).
122 Id. at 297.
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firmative defenses, 1 2 3 the bank "produced several thousand
pages of documents that would allow Plaintiffs to better under-
stand the claims and defenses in the Action." 124 Subsequently,
the parties reached a settlement obligating the bank to pay
141,237 class members 25 compensation in the amount of
$4,000,000,126 from which their attorneys were allowed to de-
duct one-third ($1,333,333) as a fee.1 2 7 The remaining sum,
net of the attorneys' expenses in the amount of $181,213128
(that included a $168,600 payment to financial experts),1 29
went to the bank's clients. Those clients included seven named
plaintiffs for whom the court approved a special award in the
amount of $35,000 ($5,000 for each plaintiff) for representing
the class.13 0
The court decided to approve this settlement after finding
that the plaintiffs and their attorneys faced a myriad of signifi-
cant risks of losing the case. Those risks had to do with the
multiple defenses raised by the bank and other complexities of
the case. '3 ' The court also noted that the settlement averted
years of highly expensive litigation and provides "immediate
and tangible benefits to nearly 150,000 Settlement Class Mem-
bers."1 32 The court's decision also made it abundantly clear
that none of the plaintiffs could successfully file and prosecute
her individual suit against the defaulting bank.13 3
Remarkably, the individual compensation amount recov-
ered by the average plaintiff in this case was $17.44. s3 This
result is by no means unique. An earlier class action that
complained about the same debit-sequencing manipulation en-
ded up in a settlement agreement that obligated the defendant,
Bank of America, to pay a record amount of $410,000,000 to
compensate over 13,000,000 account holders and their attor-
123 Id. at 298.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 303.
126 Id. at 305.
127 Id. at 306.
128 Id. at 310.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 306, 311.
131 Id. at 303-04.
132 Id. at 303.
133 Id. at 305 ("[A] class action is superior to other available methods for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the present controversy.").
134 We calculated this sum by subtracting from the plaintiffs' $4,000,000 fund
their attorneys' and experts' fees and expenses and the $35,000 award bestowed
on the seven class representatives: ($4,000,000 - $1,333,333 - $168,600 -
$35,000)/141,230 = $17.44.
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neys.13 5 From this amount, the plaintiffs' attorneys were
awarded thirty percent, net of expenses,13 6 and twenty-seven
class representatives have been approved to receive $5,000
each. 13 7 The average plaintiff consequently recovered $22. 138
The court approved the settlement after determining that
the plaintiffs faced a considerable risk of losing the case and
that prosecuting their claims "was daunting."13 9 The court
mentioned in that connection that the bank asserted thirty-
seven affirmative defenses' 4 0 and that the settlement agree-
ment has averted "highly complex and expensive litigation,"141
given that "high-to-low posting of debit card transactions is 'by
no means clearly unlawful."" 4 2 The court also estimated that
"prosecuting and settling the [plaintiffs'] claims ... demanded
considerable time and labor"1 43 and that "the issues involved
were novel and difficult and required the exceptional skill of a
highly talented group of attorneys."' 44
By the same token, the federal district court that presided
over the massive Checking Account Overdraft Litigation ruled
that a settlement yielding plaintiffs between forty-five percent
and nine percent of their anticipated recovery "provides sub-
stantial value to the Settlement Class, and is well within the
range of reasonableness."14 5
These findings unequivocally demonstrate that suing the
bank for its accounting manipulation was far beyond the ca-
pacity of individual plaintiffs. Plaintiffs need special empower-
ment to be able to prosecute such suits individually. Absent
special rules that make it easy for a deserving plaintiff to sue
the bank, class action will remain the only viable mechanism
for enforcing the law and vindicating the account-holders'
135 In re Checking Acct. Overdraft Litig., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1341-42 (S.D.
Fla. 2011).
136 Id. at 1359, 1368.
137 Id. at 1367.
138 We calculated this sum by subtracting from the plaintiffs' $410,000,000
fund their attorneys' fees in the amount of $123,000,000 and the $135,000 award
bestowed on the twenty seven class representatives: ($410,000,000 -
$123,000,000 - $135,000)/13,000,000 = $22.07. This calculation does not in-
clude the class attorneys' reimbursement for expenses as the court did not men-
tion the requisite sum.
139 In re Checking Acct. Overdraft Litig., 830 F. Supp. 2d at 1363.
140 Id. at 1339.
141 Id. at 1345.
142 Id. at 1347 (quoting Declaration of Professor Samuel Issacharoff in Support
of Settlement).
143 Id. at 1359-60.
144 Id. at 1363.
145 Id. at 1350.
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rights. Yet, class actions systematically fail to compensate in-
dividual plaintiffs for their losses.
IV
REFORM PROPOSALS
In this part, we examine how the law can be reformed to
yield a more level litigation playing field. Consistent with the
focal point of this Essay, the measures we propose aim at em-
powering individual plaintiffs. For this reason, we shy away
from class actions and other aggregative solutions that group
plaintiffs together. 146 We would like to note, though, that there
exists a heated scholarly debate about the desirability of the
use of aggregation mechanisms.' 4 7 The only point about which
there is unanimous agreement among scholars is that collec-
tive mechanisms do not adequately recompense the average
individual plaintiff for the harm she suffered.1 48
Our proposal for legal reform spans the domains of proce-
dure, evidence, and remedies. It consists of the following mea-
sures: (1) institution of fast-track litigation procedure for
qualifying suits; (2) simplification of causes of action coupled
with changes in the burden of proof; (3) introduction of "expe-
dited payment orders"-a new remedy that presently does not
exist; and (4) use of enhanced damages in appropriate cases.
As we explain, the proposed measures may be employed on a
standalone basis or together.
A. Fast-Track Litigation
Our first reform proposal consists of the introduction of
fast-track proceedings for insurance suits. Per our discussion
in Part III, one of the chief weapons of insurance companies is
delay. In as far as insurance litigation is concerned, time is
clearly on the side of insurance providers. Consider, for exam-
ple, an insured who suffered property damage. Oftentimes, the
insured and her family face an exigent need to take swift action
to repair the damage. Waiting out a long litigation process is
not an option for many property owners. Recall that owners of
146 For analysis of these solutions, see COFFEE, supra note 16.
147 See generally COFFEE, supra note 16; Gilles & Friedman, supra note 64;
Harel & Stein, supra note 45. See also Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
1439 (2008); Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch- The Strategic Uses of
Ambiguity and Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1924 (2006); Richard A. Nagareda,
Aggregation and Its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure, Class-Wide Arbitra-
tion, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1872 (2006).
148 See COFFEE, supra note 16, at 92, 229.
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severely damaged properties must often rent a different place
and simultaneously litigate. Most ordinary owners can ill-af-
ford to do that. Aware of this predicament, insurance compa-
nies have an incentive to drag their feet in processing property
insurance claims and, then, settle claims for pennies on the
dollar. The longer insurance companies can prolong the litiga-
tion process, the greater the leverage they have in settlement
negotiations.
A fast-track litigation process can substantially improve
this problem. The introduction of a swift, limited in time pro-
cess would go a long way toward denying insurance companies
one of their principal unfair advantages in their dealings with
policyholders.
It is important to understand that many insurance dis-
putes turn on contract interpretation. The primary task of
courts in such cases is to decide whether the correct interpre-
tation of the terms of the insurance contract entitles the plain-
tiff to recover from the insurance provider. Interpretation is a
task with which courts are intimately familiar. Occasionally,
insurance contracts may give rise to difficult interpretive chal-
lenges; for the most part, however, the interpretive challenges
arising from insurance contracts are standard, straightfor-
ward, and repetitive. Accordingly, courts can quickly resolve a
sizable percentage of property insurance disputes. 149
Disputes over life insurance are also prone to quick resolu-
tion. The vast majority of those disputes turn on the truthful-
ness of the insured's pre-contractual disclosure statement.
Other disputes are about the actual cause of the insured's
death and whether it is covered by the policy. Both types of
disputes involve claims that repeat themselves across multiple
cases. Correspondingly, courts can and should develop stan-
dardized methods for resolving those claims without much cost
and delay. Therefore, we call for the adoption of a fast-track
proceeding that would allow property and life insurance cases
to be decided within a period of nine months.
One can argue contra our proposal that implementation of
such a system will negatively impact other cases. After all,
judges are burdened by a heavy workload and court schedules
are fully booked.15 0 Ceteris paribus, the introduction of a fast
149 This proposal has been inspired by A. A. S. Zuckerman, Quality and Econ-
omy in Civil Procedure: The Case for Commuting Correct Judgments for Timely
Judgments, 14 OxFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 353 (1994).
150 See Toby J. Stem, Federal Judges and Fearing the "Floodgates of Litiga-
tion", 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 377, 386-90 (2003) (noting that rising federal caseloads
13532017]1
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
track for insurance cases invariably means that other cases
will take longer to resolve. Therefore, under present condi-
tions, the prioritization of one category of cases implicates a
longer wait for others.
We have a three-prong response to this concern. First, we
would like to note that the delay resulting from the introduc-
tion of fast-track proceedings is not going to be as serious at it
may first appear. The proceedings we envision would not in-
volve long waits between hearings, and, hence, would proceed
much more smoothly and efficiently than standard cases. Sec-
ond, we would condition the use of fast track litigation on the
plaintiffs payment of higher court fees. The higher fees would
serve to compensate other types of litigants. Ideally, the addi-
tional proceeds from the higher fees paid by fast-track litigants
would be used to hire more judges. An increase in the number
of judges would allow courts to hear more cases, to reduce the
individual judges' dockets, and push forward the court dates
for other cases. Hence, the benefit from the introduction of
fast-track proceedings and fees may well inure to all litigants.
The imposition of higher fees on fast-track plaintiffs would
have another salutary effect: it would create a separating equi-
librium among plaintiffs, allowing plaintiffs with especially
strong cases to signal this fact to courts. Currently, strong
plaintiffs (i.e., plaintiffs with strong claims) and weak plaintiffs
(i.e., plaintiffs with weak claims) are grouped together in a pool-
ing equilibrium. Strong plaintiffs have no way of signaling their
type to the court before trial, as there is only one litigation path
for both types of plaintiffs. The introduction of a fast track
option for a higher fee would result in a two-option menu that
would enable plaintiffs to signal their type. In particular, it
would allow strong plaintiffs to separate themselves from weak
ones by agreeing to pay a higher fee to have their case consid-
ered on an expedited basis. This fee payment would put the
plaintiffs money where her mouth is and signal to the court
that the plaintiff has a strong suit. This signal would be credi-
ble because plaintiffs with weak or speculative claims would
generally be unwilling to pay an increased court fee.
have resulted in "federal courts [being] heavily burdened with constantly full
dockets" and examining the strain this places on judges); NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE
COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2008 STATE COURT
CASELOADS 24 (2010), http://www.courtstatistics.org/-/media/Microsites/Files/
CSP/EWSC-2008-Online.ashx [https://perma.cc/U9CH-6URZ] (positing that
state civil cases "are increasing at a time when many courts are struggling due to
diminished resources" and presenting data that state civil caseloads increased a
total of 29% from 1999 to 2008).
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Naturally, plaintiffs cannot accurately assess the strength
of their suits on their own. They would have to consult attor-
neys in tackling this task. This is a good thing, however. Attor-
neys would strengthen the sorting mechanism that would
divert appropriate suits to the fast track, leaving all others for
standard proceedings. As legal experts whose remuneration
(and reputation) hinges on dispensing accurate advice to their
clients, attorneys would be wary to refer clients to fast track
proceedings and have them pay a higher fee unless they believe
in good faith that their clients have a good chance to succeed
on the merits. Accordingly, attorneys would advise clients to
use the fast track option only if they believe in the merit of the
case. This, in turn, would allow courts to rely on the signal
sent by a plaintiffs decision to use fast track proceedings.
Third, and equally important, the introduction of a fast
track with heightened fees would trigger a suit-sorting dynamic
that would encourage insurance companies to offer their in-
sureds fairer early stage settlements, instead of strategically
denying their claims in the hopes of dragging them into pro-
longed litigation proceedings. Insurance companies' infamous
strategy of "delay, deny, and defend" critically depends on their
ability to threaten rightful claimants with the prospect of ex-
pensive and protracted litigation. By lowering this threat, our
proposed system would give insurers an incentive to avoid mer-
itless litigation.
B. Advanced Payment Orders
Our second, and arguably most innovative, reform propo-
sal is to empower courts to order advanced payments to plain-
tiffs in appropriate healthcare cases brought under ERISA. We
are well aware of the fact that the remedy we propose marks a
clear deviation from current practices. Yet, we believe the
change is warranted. At present, the only preliminary reme-
dies courts are entitled to award are injunctions; monetary
awards are handed out at the end of the trial. We believe that
advanced payments should be added to the menu of prelimi-
nary remedies that courts would be allowed to award. In
healthcare suits, ailing policyholders frequently cannot wait for
the conclusion of their trial. For many of them, receiving treat-
ment expeditiously is literally a matter of life and death. The
final judgment may come too late for them. In the meantime,
while the trial is in process, such plaintiffs do not have the
financial resources to pay for the expensive treatments they
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need. Advance payment of some of the money claimed under
the healthcare insurance policy can help them a great deal.
We are fully cognizant of the fact that some may oppose the
measure on grounds of unfairness to healthcare providers. Af-
ter all, insureds may ultimately lose the case and, at that point,
may not be able to return the money they received to health-
care providers. While we agree that this is a concern, we con-
tend that it is not as serious as first meets the eye, and that it
cannot carry the day. First, there is a vast disparity between
the interests of the parties that hang in the balance here. The
interest of the healthcare insurance provider is purely mone-
tary; the interest of the patient is in her life or limb. Second, to
limit the exposure of healthcare providers to the risk of non-
repayment, we would place a cap of 20% on the amounts to be
advanced to patients. Furthermore, under our proposal,
courts would have discretion to condition payment on the per-
formance of certain conditions, such as provision of payback
guarantees. Third, and most importantly, advanced payment
orders would be reserved to cases where a court was convinced
that the plaintiff has no other viable option to pay for her treat-
ment and that she has a high probability of succeeding on the
merits. In other words, the substantive conditions for ordering
the remedies would be very similar to those used by courts in
awarding preliminary injunctions. This is important because
courts have a lot of experience with preliminary injunctions
and they would be able to harness that experience in adjudicat-
ing requests for advance payments.
Two final notes are in order. First, many insurance dis-
putes do not revolve around the issue of liability, but rather
around the amount owed to the insured. In these cases, the
only question is how much the insurance provider will ulti-
mately have to pay. Hence, an advanced payment of the type
we propose would not harm the insurer at all, nor would it
expose it to any risk. All it would do is force the insurer to pay a
certain percentage of the amount owed to the plaintiff earlier.
Second, the practical effect of preliminary injunctions that are
routinely used by courts is typically far more extreme than the
likely effect of our proposal. Orders of advanced payment are
unlikely to have such a far-reaching effect.
C. Redesigning Liability, Defenses, and Evidentiary
Burdens
Another way to make litigation fairer to plaintiffs is by rede-
signing liability, defenses, and evidentiary burdens. Recall that
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the more elements a plaintiff needs to prove, the more money
she will be required to spend on litigation and less likely she
will be to succeed on the merits. Contrariwise, the more de-
fenses a defendant can raise, the more likely he will be to defeat
the suit. Evidentiary burdens, too, play a critical part in shap-
ing the power relations between plaintiffs and defendants. Re-
quiring plaintiffs to prove certain elements, such as intent, or
scienter, can go a long way toward dooming their suits, as
these elements are notoriously difficult to prove. Critically, de-
fendants do not suffer from the same problem. While it is true
that some defenses may be difficult to prove, defendants can
typically sidestep this problem by raising a different defense
that may be proved more facilely. After all, plaintiffs must
prove all the elements of their lawsuit in order to win the case,
while defendants can prevail by proving one defense out of
many.
The foregoing analysis seems to present a prima facie case
for simplifying causes of actions and reducing the number of
defenses available to defendants. Yet, in proceeding along this
path, one needs to tread with caution. Causes of action and
defenses have not been designed on a whim. Each element in a
cause of action, as well as each defense, was presumably
adopted for a reason. Eliminating elements (or defenses) willy-
nilly will therefore work to the detriment of our society. The
approach we advocate is much more nuanced and circum-
spect. We argue that the option of simplifying causes of action
and eliminating defenses should be reserved for those cases in
which defendants enjoy a systematic advantage over plaintiffs
on account of economies of scope and scale, per our discussion
in Part II. In such cases, the combination of complexity and
cost disadvantage often presents an insurmountable obstacle
for plaintiffs, and, thus, justifies legislative intervention.
Return to our discussion of consumer finance litigation in
Subpart III.C. in which we noted plaintiffs' cost-disadvantage
vis-a-vis banks and financial institutions. To empower plain-
tiffs in this context, we recommend two complementary legal
measures. First, we call on lawmakers to simplify the defini-
tion of individuals' entitlements in the area of consumer fi-
nance. Second, and equally important, lawmakers would do
well to shift the burden of proof to the bank in all cases involv-
ing hidden interest and fees, so that the bank will lose the case
when it fails to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
the disputed charges are reasonable and fair.
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An important piece of federal legislation, known as Dodd-
Frank,1 5 1 made a desirable, albeit incomplete, move in that
direction. The statute has created a special Consumer Finan-
cial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and authorized it to issue rules
and individual declarations that prohibit financial institutions
"from committing or engaging in an unfair, deceptive, or abu-
sive act or practice under Federal law in connection with any
transaction with a consumer for a consumer financial product
or service." 1 5 2 The prohibition of unfair and deceitful bank
practices existed before Dodd-FYank. Dodd-Frank supple-
mented it by banning and penalizing "abusive" behavior on the
part of a bank or another financial institution. 153
In tune with existing law, the statute defines "unfairness"
as an "act or practice [that] causes or is likely to cause substan-
tial injury to consumers, which is not reasonably avoidable by
consumers ... [and] is not outweighed by countervailing bene-
fits to consumers or to competition."15 4 The definition calls for
a comprehensive, complicated, and costly economic analysis
that would have to account for many "countervailing benefit"
defenses asserted by the bank. 15 5 Proof of "unfairness" is be-
yond the ability of the ordinary consumer. Consequently,
many consumers have no choice but to rely on the CFPB's
administrative action against the bank.
Deception is equally hard to establish. Deception requires
proof that the bank purposefully misrepresented or concealed
material information.15 6 For obvious reasons, banks resorting
to such practices would also do everything they can to avoid
detection. 15 7 Evidence showing fraudulent intent on the part of
the bank is therefore rarely available.1 5 8
151 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531 (2012)).
152 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a) (2012).
153 Id.
154 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531(c)(1)(A)-(B) (2012).
155 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c)(1)(B) (2012) (requiring the Bureau to weigh "counter-
vailing benefits to consumers or to competition").
156 See Dali6 Jimenez, Dirty Debts Sold Dirt Cheap, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 41,
114 (2015) ("Deception is not defined in the Dodd-Frank Act, but the CFPB has
issued guidance that an act or practice is deceptive when . . . [it] misleads or is
likely to mislead the consumer . . . .").
157 See generally Chris William Sanchirico, Detection Avoidance, 81 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1331, 1337-41, 1361-65 (2006) (explaining incentive to avoid detection).
158 Id. at 1367 ("The investment bank Morgan Stanley was ... sued for aiding
and abetting fraud . . . . Ordered to produce relevant e-mail correspondence, it
stonewalled. Ordered to produce documents relevant to the accusation that it was
stonewalling, it stonewalled.") (footnotes omitted).
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The bank's hidden fees and interest, however, may also be
categorized and penalized as "abusive" pursuant to Dodd-
Frank. The statute defines as "abusive" an act or practice that
"materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to under-
stand a term or condition of a consumer financial product or
service" or "takes unreasonable advantage" of the consumer's
inadequate information, inferior bargaining power, or reli-
ance. 15 9 This definition is broad enough to outlaw hidden fees
and interest, and it is also intuitive enough to be understood
and expeditiously applied by courts.16 0 Critically, any dispute
over whether the bank abused the client would center on the
single issue of "abuse," which implies no alternating defenses.
This formulation denies banks the privilege of raising multiple
overlaying defenses that they enjoy under the conventional ar-
chitecture of liability.161
Unfortunately, the abuse doctrine only defines the CFPB's
power to protect consumers against mistreatment by issuing
cease-and-desist orders 62 and by commencing civil actions
against the bank.16 3 When the CFPB decides not to use this
power, the abuse doctrine becomes inoperative. The aggrieved
client cannot raise it in court and ask the judge to declare the
bank's overcharges "abusive" and, consequently, unlawful.1 6 4
Instead, she must lift the heavy burden of establishing an un-
fair practice, deceit, or a breach of contract.
We therefore propose to create an additional rule that will
use the Dodd-Frank's "abuse" prohibition and deem any
facially abusive banking practice presumptively unlawful. The
bank's inherent informational advantage and economies of
scale would allow it to easily rebut this presumption and prove
that its practice was benign. For that reason, the law should
place the burden of proof on the bank notwithstanding its de-
fendant status.165 Under this regime, when the bank fails to
159 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d) (2012).
160 See generally Schonberg, supra note 120, at 1433-39 (explaining Dodd-
Franks prohibition of abusive banking practices and its implications for con-
sumer finance).
161 Id. at 1432-33 (explaining that the "abusive" standard involves global as-
sessment of whether the bank took unreasonable advantage of the consumer).
162 12 U.S.C. § 5563(b) (2012).
163 12 U.S.C. § 5564 (2012).
164 Under 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a), only the CFPB has the authority to declare a
banking practice "abusive" and act against that practice.
165 See Raleigh v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 21 n.1 (2000) (con-
firming that "compelling justifications" for shifting the burden of persuasion to a
party include the party's "readier access to the relevant information" and "the
importance of encouraging voluntary compliance by giving [similarly situated ac-
tors] incentives to self-report and to keep adequate records in case of dispute")
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prove by a preponderance of the evidence that its facially abu-
sive practice was benign, it will lose the case. Shifting the
burden of proof, per our suggestion, would give clients who
were wronged a real chance at getting redress.1 6 6
The architecture of liability can also be modified in a less
drastic fashion, namely, by altering the standard of proof. As a
rule, the plaintiff must prove all the elements of her suit by the
preponderance of the evidence, while the defendant is subject
to the same evidentiary standard when raising an affirmative
defense. Requiring a heightened standard of proof for affirma-
tive defenses consequently has the potential for leveling the
playing field. This measure should be used parsimoniously
and only in appropriate cases. We believe it is particularly
apposite in cases in which defendants have multiple defenses
at their disposal. When the law endows defendants with multi-
ple defenses to liability, they may be asked to prove certain
defenses not by the preponderance of the evidence, but rather
by "clear and convincing" evidence. 167
Evidence law has a longstanding policy of attaching the
"clear and convincing" proof requirement to socially disfavored
defenses. 1 6 We propose to treat defenses that give defendants
excessive power in the courtroom as socially disfavored. It is
noteworthy that raising the proof standard would usually be
preferable to burden shifting because it requires no concomi-
tant changes in the architecture of liability.
To illustrate this point, consider again a consumer's suit
that complains about her bank's manipulative debit-sequenc-
(first citing United States v. Rexach, 482 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1039 (1973); and then citing United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141,
145 (1975)).
166 Our proposed regime also would not allow banks to hide behind small-
print arbitration clauses in their agreements with clients. Forcing a client to
arbitrate her suit against the bank pursuant to such a clause would be uncon-
scionable. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011) (quot-
ing Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)) (interpreting
Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act as permitting courts to invalidate agree-
ments to arbitrate by "generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud,
duress, or unconscionability"); see also Franks v. Bowers, 116 So.3d 1240,
1250-51 (Fla. 2013) (nullifying arbitration agreement that denied plaintiff reme-
dies to which she was entitled under law); Rodriguez v. Superior Court, 176 Cal.
App. 4th 1461, 1472 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (refusing to enforce a statutorily permit-
ted agreement to arbitrate medical malpractice claims upon finding that the pa-
tient did not waive her right to a jury trial and voluntarily).
167 See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 340, at 487-89 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th
ed. 2006).
168 Id. at 488.
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ing practice.16 9 If our proposal were adopted, the bank would
be required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
the challenged practice was benign. Alternatively-for those
who believe that shifting the burden of proof is too drastic a
measure-we recommend imposing a heightened proof stan-
dard for affirmative defenses that the bank might raise to de-
feat the consumer's suit. Concretely, if the bank argues that
even if the consumer proves that its debit-sequencing practice
was unfair or deceptive, her suit is still doomed to fail because
of her waiver, ratification, voluntary payment, or failure to miti-
gate the loss, 17 0 it will have to prove each of those defenses by
clear and convincing evidence, as opposed to mere preponder-
ance. Each of these measures would make it easier for individ-
ual plaintiffs to bring suits against banks.
D. Enhanced Damages
Our fourth reform proposal focuses on damages. Specifi-
cally, we call for more extensive use of enhanced damages in all
the legal contexts identified in Part III and in other industries in
which litigation costs systematically favor defendants. The
availability of enhanced damages would give plaintiffs a much
needed threat point in their legal interactions with powerful
defendants. The design of entitlements, defenses, and reme-
dies determines not only what parties can achieve in court, but
also their bargaining positions vis-a-vis each other outside of it.
The use of enhanced damages is not foreign to our legal
system. At present, treble damages may be awarded to suc-
cessful plaintiffs in antitrust and patent suits, as well as in
various other contexts.171 We are clearly not the first to call for
more extensive use of enhanced damages; similar calls have
been made in the past.1 7 2 Importantly, though, we highlight a
new reason for awarding enhanced damages, one that is very
different from the conventional justification. Conventional wis-
dom suggests that enhanced damages ought to be awarded
169 See Jenkins v. Trustmark Nat. Bank, 300 F.R.D. 291, 299-300 (S.D. Miss.
2014); In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1341 (S.D.
Fla. 2011).
170 These defenses have been raised by the bank in a recent case In re Check-
ing Account Overdraft Litigation, 307 F.R.D. 630, 650-52 (S.D. Fla. 2015).
171 For discussion of treble damages under various statutory provisions, see
Margaret H. Lemos & Alex Stein, Strategic Enforcement, 95 MINN. L. REV. 9, 15-16
(2010).
172 See generally A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An
Economic Analysis, 111 HARv. L. REV. 869, 887-96 (1998) (identifying circum-
stances under which courts should obligate defendants to pay enhanced
damages).
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when a wrong was committed willfully or intentionally. That is,
the increased damage award is supposed to reflect the moral
culpability of the wrongdoer or, more precisely, our moral re-
pugnance. Law and Economics scholars have advanced a dif-
ferent justification for the use of enhanced damages. By their
lights, the role of damages is to achieve deterrence. On this
view, enhanced damages should be awarded to compensate for
the less than perfect detection rates that result in under-en-
forcement. We propose a different justification for the use of
enhanced damages. In our view, they should be used to com-
pensate for the disparity between plaintiffs and defendants. In
other words, enhanced damage awards should be used to level
the litigation playing field. 173
Enhanced damages have their detractors. A well-known
argument against enhanced damages is that they can some-
times lead to excessive compensation awards-especially when
used by juries. This argument, if correct, primarily applies to
punitive damages. Unlimited punitive damages give adjudica-
tors unbridled discretion that may, at least in theory, be
abused in certain cases. However, the problem is much less
acute when reasonable damage multipliers, or damage caps,
are used, as in the case of treble damages. Treble damages, for
example, empower adjudicators to award plaintiffs up to three
times their actual harm, but not more than this amount.
Hence, treble damages appear to strike the right balance be-
tween compensation and deterrence.
Another argument against the use of enhanced damages is
that the criteria for their award are too harsh. For example,
commentators have argued that the need to prove willfulness
in patent infringement suits as a precondition for collecting
treble damages is too onerous on plaintiffs. 1 7 4 We agree. Yet,
the fix is not to eliminate treble damages altogether, but rather
to remove the onerous precondition of willfulness. Our propo-
sal does exactly that.
As we explained, in our view, enhanced damages should
not be conditioned on the elements of willfulness, intent, or
malice; rather, they should be awarded whenever there are
inherent cost asymmetries that favor defendants and the latter
173 Cf De Mot & Stein, supra note 8, at 1279-82 (developing damage multi-
plier to offset defendants' structural advantage and analyzing its pros and cons).
174 See Christopher B. Seaman, Willful Patent Infhingement and Enhanced
Damages After In Re Seagate: An Empirical Study, 97 IOwA L. REv. 417, 419 (2012)
(noting that "knowledgeable observers asserted that ... proving willful infringe-
ment . .. [is] difficult, ultimately resulting in far fewer willfulness findings and
enhanced-damages awards" and citing sources).
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have taken advantage of these asymmetries to force plaintiffs
into unfair settlements. We would like to add that the elimina-
tion of qualifiers and conditions dovetails our plea for simplifi-
cation of causes of action made in the previous section. In
some types of suits-for instance, in those that involve oppres-
sive treatment of a policyholder by an insurance company' 7 5-
intentionality should be the touchstone of supracompensatory
awards. In suits such as those that complain about hidden
fees and interest charged by a bank on its client's account,
there is no need to impose this requirement.
The point and purpose of the preceding discussion was to
bring to light the range of measures lawmakers can adopt in
order to give individual plaintiffs meaningful access to the
court system. Another goal of ours was to illustrate how the
measures we discuss may be employed in different litigation
contexts. We would like to make it clear that the examples we
used are merely illustrative. Importantly, our proposed mea-
sures are not mutually exclusive and do not exhaust the op-
tions lawmakers have at their disposal. Nothing in our
discussion should be read to bar lawmakers from combining
the measures we discuss as they see fit. On the contrary, in
certain litigation contexts it may be advisable to combine the
substantive, procedural, evidentiary, and remedial measures
we discuss, and, on top of it, allow successful plaintiffs to re-
ceive attorneys' fees.
We would also like to emphasize that the mirror image
problem of strong plaintiff-predators, who take advantage of
weak defendants, is as real, troubling, and prevalent as that of
plaintiffs who must confront strong defendants. Let us be
clear: defendants who are preyed on by strong plaintiffs are
entitled to the protection of the law. In fact, we have written
about this problem elsewhere.1 7 6 However, it must be borne in
mind that there are two critical differences between the plight
of individual plaintiffs and that of individual defendants. First,
in the case of individual plaintiffs, we deal with people whose
rights under the law have been violated, breached, or compro-
mised. Litigation is their only way to seek recourse. Individual
defendants, by contrast, suffered no prior injustice out of
court; their only harm or injury stems from the litigation pro-
175 For a famous example of such misconduct, see State Farm Mut. Automo-
bile Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
176 See Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 4, at 1135-40.
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cess. There is no preexisting harm in this case for which de-
fendants must obtain recourse. To follow the widely used
distinction between "primary" activities and "secondary" litiga-
tion behavior,1 77 when power disparities that exist in our legal
system harm plaintiffs, those plaintiffs suffer primary or sub-
stantive injustice. Injustice suffered by weak defendants, on
the other hand, is secondary or procedural, which, of course,
does not make those defendants unworthy of redress. 178
Second, the challenge of individual defendants calls for
different solutions than that of individual plaintiffs.' 79 In the
case of individual defendants, the goal is prevention and it
ought to be achieved via deterrence. Legal policy in this respect
should provide defendants the tools to ward off frivolous, or
extortionary, lawsuits by well-financed bodies. Hence, it is im-
portant to keep the two challenges distinct and devise a unique
set of solutions for each of them. But there is a greater lesson
here: in thinking about litigation reform, academics and
lawmakers must adopt a highly contextualized and nuanced
perspective that can do justice to the specific challenges that
arise in different litigation settings.
CONCLUSION
Civil suits by individual plaintiffs are the only way by which
the law can attain the goals of efficiency, in the form of deter-
rence against wrongdoings, and justice, in the form of just
compensation to the wrongdoings' victims. To be sure, each of
those goals can be advanced on its own by other means. Deter-
rence can be attained, for example, via the criminal justice
system or via regulation. Deterrence can also be brought about
by class actions, when they are available, or by other means of
aggregate litigation. None of those means, however, ensures
justice in the form of compensation, or substantive redress, to
individual plaintiffs. The justice objective that requires making
deserving victims whole may be secured via special funds set
up for this purpose. But the use of such funds produces no
deterrent effects, which allows wrongdoings to persist. Individ-
ual private suits, by forcing wrongdoers to compensate their
victims, are unique in that they correlate efficiency and justice.
Unfortunately, individual plaintiffs are becoming an endan-
gered species in many litigation contexts. The structure of lia-
177 See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Distortionary Effect of Evi-
dence on Primary Behavior, 124 HARV. L. REV. 518, 521-23 (2010).
178 Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 4, at 1161-69.
179 Id.
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bility and defenses, together with the economies of scale and
scope enjoyed by corporate defendants, make individual pur-
suits of justice impractical, not to say impossible.
In this Essay, we highlighted the plight of individual plain-
tiffs, analyzed its causes, and proposed ways to attenuate the
pro-defendant bias that pervades certain industries. Specifi-
cally, we proposed a series of reforms that included the restruc-
turing of liability and defenses, changes in the burden of proof,
and the addition of interim and permanent remedies, to make
litigation more accessible for individual plaintiffs. Our pro-
posed measures can be used on a standalone basis or in com-
bination, depending on the specific circumstances of the case.
Individual plaintiffs are indispensable to our legal system.
They play a pivotal role in exposing misconduct and illicit prac-
tices and are the driver of doctrinal progress. Their involve-
ment in civil litigation is of great importance also because it
helps preserve public trust in the law. Implementing our re-
form proposals will reinstate individual plaintiffs into the posi-
tion they are supposed to hold in our legal system.
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